Johan
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CANADA: PROVINCES RULE
Robert Young
The story of municipal government within the Canadian federation is largely one of
success. Stable local governments administer a wide range of services and provide public goods,
within a framework of democratic accountability. Canada has a long tradition of local control of
municipal governments, and these generally function adequately and efficiently. But there are
always strains in the system, and those currently manifest have produced the most lively debate
in decades. Despite pressures and some evolution, though, the essence of the system remains
unaltered: the provincial governments control municipalities and what they do.
It is inaccurate to speak of “the system” of municipal government. The defining
institutional characteristic of Canadian municipalities is their constitutional position as a
competence of the provincial governments. As the well worn phrase has it, they are “creatures of
the provinces.” Hence there are ten provincial-municipal systems in Canada (with three more in
the northern territories of Yukon, Nunavut and the Northwest Territories), and there have been
sharp differences across these systems. But there have been commonalities too, and one political
constant is the chafing of local governments against constraints imposed by provincial
governments, and irritation with unilateral action from above. Led by the larger cities, local
governments have sought more autonomy and - a universal demand - more resources. Recently,
they have also turned to the federal government in Ottawa, seeking funds and a “seat at the table”
to discuss policies important at the municipal level.
Municipal issues have risen on the Canadian policy agenda in part because of
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demographic pressures. Immigration from abroad is producing explosive growth in the larger
centres, while smaller, peripheral municipalities must cope with population stagnation or
decline.1 Also there is a sense that cities are vital for national competitiveness in the globalized
economy, as loci of human capital and innovation.2 In urban centres, citizens’ concerns about
pollution, crime, poverty and inadequate infrastructure resonate with politicians at all levels of
government. Finally, as the big agglomerations grow steadily, interdependencies multiply, and
the question of how to deal with them becomes more important.
So several issues are prominent in Canada. How can local governments get more money
and more autonomy? How should senior governments deal with municipalities that vary greatly
in size and policy capacity? How should the provincial and federal governments help with the
problems of the metropoles - social exclusion, poverty, the cost of infrastructure and sprawl -
while mitigating the problems of decline in the periphery - unemployment and costly services? Is
it sensible to use multilevel approaches, despite their complexity, or are disentanglement and
clear accountability preferable? These are some of the issues addressed throughout this chapter.
Introductory overview
Canada is a vast country. It covers 9,017,700 square kilometers. With a population in
2006 of 31,612,897, the country seems very sparsely settled, with 3.51 inhabitants per square
kilometer.3 But this is misleading, because in effect Canada is a long, thin country, with about
two-thirds of the population located within 200km of the southern border. In fact, fully 80
percent of Canadians live in urban areas, with almost 23 percent in the big metropolitan areas of
Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.4 But substantial numbers live in the towns and rural parts of
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the Atlantic provinces, in the northern mining and forestry towns and the fertile southern farm
regions of Ontario and Quebec, across the agricultural Prairies, and in the resource-producing
areas of central and northern British Columbia. There are also over 100,000 people in the three
northern territories.5
Canada has always been a settler country. The indigenous population comprises many
Indian bands - First Nations - throughout the south, and the Inuit peoples of the north. But they
are now small minorities in a population derived from the first French settlers (1604-1750), and
waves of American Loyalists (1774-1800), English and Scots (early 1800s), Irish (mid-1800s),
and Western Europeans and Ukranians (1890-1920). Recent settlers have come from all over the
world, and Canada, with annual immigration rates just below 1 percent of the total population, is
highly multicultural. French remains the mother tongue of 23 percent of Canadians and English
of 58 percent, while Chinese, German, Italian and Punjabi each make up well over 1 percent.6
Canada is a rich country. In 2006, gross domestic product was about $41,200 per capita.7
An advanced industrial country, with 63 percent of business-sector GDP arising from services, it
is also resource-rich: manufacturing accounts for 17.l percent of total GDP, but primary-sector
activities in agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, mining and energy account for another 14
percent.8 Over the past decades in Canada, the relative fiscal presence of government has
diminished, as the federal government’s outlay was 19.35 percent of GDP in 1980 but just 16.05
percent in 2005, while other governments’ shares were stable.9 Government debt per capita in
Canada is about $20,000, with the federal government responsible for about two-thirds of this
total, which has been declining since 1997.10
At the senior levels, Canada has a relatively simple structure of government.11 It remains
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a constitutional monarchy. The Queen is the Head of State, represented in Canada by the
Governor General and provincially by Lieutenant Governors. The system is Parliamentary,
unicameral in the provinces and with an appointed Senate complementing the House of
Commons in Ottawa. The legislatures are elected through the single-member plurality
mechanism, which usually produces strong majority governments. The position of Prime
Minister is particularly powerful in the Canadian context.12 The checks on executive power
come from opposition parties, the Senate, the media, and the courts, which have expansively
interpreted the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms since it became part of the constitution
in 1982. As well, there is an alert and generally well educated citizenry.
Since World War II, Canada has had a relatively stable three-party system, with the
mainstream Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties alternating power, while the New
Democratic Party, a social-democratic formation, retained substantial support. In 1993 this
system fragmented, but now has returned to past form, except that the Quebec-based Bloc
Québécois, a sovereigntist party, has won a majority of seats in the province since 1993, and the
major centre-right party is now the Conservative Party. Overall, the Canadian political system is
comparatively stable, with the major force to the contrary being the sovereigntist movement in
Quebec.13 Politics traditionally revolves around the cleavages of region and ideology more than
class, while issues of social cohesion and other urban problems have emerged more recently.
History, structures and institutions of local government
Local government in Canada is wonderfully complex. Most Canadians have a core
understanding of it as an authority that operates over a limited territory, providing a range of
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services to inhabitants. But the concept is contested. Some citizens and analysts and participants
stress how local governments provide services and accommodate the choices made by
individuals and firms; others emphasize local democracy and the representation of citizens’
preferences about the shape of their community.14
There is a wide range of local government structures in Canada, reflecting different
provincial conditions. But a core model from which variations can be understood is the Ontario
system, instituted by the Municipal Act of 1849, which was both an administrative solution and
the culmination of a struggle for democratic control of governing institutions. The basic units,
equipped with elected councils, were the townships, towns and villages (all “lower-tier” entities),
with “upper-tier” county governments carrying out more general functions. The Act also
provided for self-governing “separated towns” and cities, which did not share functions with
counties. Originally, this system was largely reproduced in other provinces, with variations about
towns being included in counties and about how county councillors were chosen. Where
populations were sparse, as in most of Western Canada, there was only one tier, and local
authorities had more limited powers.15
These structures suited agrarian societies where municipalities carried out a few basic
functions, even in the commercial centres. After the late 1800s, urbanization and
industrialization provided the usual challenges about public health, housing and transit, and later
the transition to an advanced industrial society, overwhelmingly urban, brought new concerns
about infrastructure, social diversity, and environmental sustainability. Structural reforms
ensued, but it is remarkable that much of the basic system remains intact.
Local government does not blanket Canada. In rural areas, several provincial
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governments provide some services, and direct government of them has occurred, as when New
Brunswick abolished its counties in 1967.16 Large tracts of “Crown Land” across the country are
owned and administered by the provinces. Elsewhere, local government prevails. Nowhere does
it enjoy the larger powers of provinces, as do the German city-states, though occasional demands
for provincial status are heard.17 However some cities are predominant within their provinces:
Winnipeg makes up 55.2 percent of the population of Manitoba, and Halifax (31.0 percent),
Calgary (30.0 percent), Montreal (21.5 percent), and Toronto (20.2 percent) comprise large
proportions of Nova Scotia, Alberta, Quebec, and Ontario respectively.18 This weight confers
political strength, despite municipalities’ constitutional weaknesses.
Municipalities are not the only components of local government in Canada, for most have
spun off agencies, boards and commissions that fulfil specialized functions. The most ubiquitous
are school boards, normally elected. Originally their boundaries approximated those of
municipalities, but the drive to attain economies of scale and deliver specialized services
produced massive consolidation. The public, English-language system in Ontario has only 56
school boards and authorities, while New Brunswick has 15 and Nova Scotia only eight. Other
specialized agencies provide many services. Edmonton, Alberta, is an extreme example: while
an extensive public transit system is run by a department of the municipal government, there are
agencies for public health, housing, economic development, police, libraries and non-profit
housing, as well as a public enterprise that handles water supply, wastewater, and electrical
generation, transmission and distribution.19 Agencies in other cities manage parks, recreation,
planning and tourism. Some of these were created in order to insulate administration from
political pressures (in policing, for example) and to allow expertise to dominate (as in public
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health).
In other cases, flexible, single-purpose agencies allow for inter-municipal co-operation to
capture externalities and economies of scale.20 In fact most municipalities engage in joint
institutions and cooperative arrangements. In the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, for
instance, there are twenty Regional Economic Development Boards that bring together
municipalities and other stakeholders within development zones.21 There are in Canada many
such cooperative institutions, some provincially mandated, that link municipalities in a horizontal
fashion. As well, contractual arrangements for providing particular services across municipal
boundaries are common.
Canadian municipalities operate within vertical tiers of government. Multilevel
structures are commonplace. County systems or their equivalents are found in the big provinces
of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, and in Nova Scotia. In large metropolitan regions the
problem of scale has found three answers.22 The first is the flexible regional authority, of which
the Greater Vancouver Regional District is the prime example. The city of Vancouver proper has
a small population (only 27.5 percent of its Census Metropolitan Area [CMA], which includes 21
other municipalities and three Indian reservations). But the GVRD manages regional water
supply, sewage, parks, and solid waste, as well as planning regional transportation, land use and
air quality. Like the other regional districts in British Columbia, the GVRD encourages inter-
municipal cooperation and is flexible in that municipalities may opt in for particular functions.
The second solution is amalgamation; that is, internalizing all functions within a single,
larger city. Here the most notable examples are Halifax, Ottawa, Winnipeg and Calgary, all of
which largely encompass their CMAs within the footprint of one city government. The third is to
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establish metropolitan authorities where an upper-tier government provides certain common
services. The prototypical Canadian cases were Metropolitan Toronto, established in 1954, and
the Montreal Urban Community, created in 1970. These upper-tier institutions delivered
common services including arterial roads, policing and transit, and water supply and sewers (in
Toronto). But both have now been abolished. Since a massive amalgamation in 1998, the City
of Toronto operates over the whole area that was served by Metro Toronto. In 2002, all the
municipalities on the island of Montreal were amalgamated into the City of Montreal, though
subsequently a new Quebec government permitted secession referenda and some municipalities
did de-amalgamate.23 But tiered government remains necessary. The enlarged city of Toronto
remains too small to manage regional transport and land-use planning issues, so the province has
taken the lead. In Montreal, the core city is part of the Conseil d’Agglomération that provides
important services to all municipalities on the island and also of the Communauté Métropolitaine
de Montréal, which covers the whole Montreal connurbation and has responsibilities for
transportation infrastructure, promotion and planning.24
There are no formal structures through which Aboriginal people participate directly in
local councils in southern Canada.25 Where reserves are near municipalities or within them, there
is consultation about matters such as water supply and waste management, and when new urban
reserves are established within city boundaries, intensive negotiations involve municipal
officials.26 Courts have recently affirmed that local governments have a “duty to consult” with
First Nations when action might affect Aboriginal people’s interests.27 Representatives of
Aboriginal governments sometimes sit on committees managing particular programs or projects,
as in Saskatchewan where the Aboriginal population, over 13 percent of the provincial total, is
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increasingly urbanized.28 Finally, it is worth noting that jurisdiction over off-reserve Aboriginals
living in municipalities is unclear. The federal government does not take responsibility, and so
the cost of services for them are generally borne by provincial and local governments.
Constitutional recognition of local government
Canadian municipalities have no constitutional recognition as a sphere or order of
government. Instead, since 1867, “Municipal Institutions in the Province” have fallen into the
category of matters about which provincial legislatures “may exclusively make Laws.”29 This
fact is primordial to understanding municipal government in Canada. Local governments are
entirely subject to the dictates of provincial governments, which can shift municipal
responsibilities, finances and boundaries as they see fit. Provincial departments enforce the laws
and regulations that govern municipal activities. Often provincial power has been used to good
effect, establishing regional cooperative bodies, for example, and reining in destructive inter-
municipal competition (as in the longstanding Ontario prohibition of municipal concessions to
industry). But provincial constraints and sudden changes to structures and functions have
irritated many municipal leaders. This lack of autonomy also has instilled in some local
politicians and officials a sense of dependence and complacency, and a tendency to blame
provincial authorities for difficulties.30
Canadian provinces do not have separate constitutions, so the framework within which
municipalities operate is established by normal legislation which may be amended at any time.
Municipal Acts (or their equivalents) lay out the governance structures of municipalities and
enumerate their functions. Traditionally, the responsibilities of local governments were narrowly
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defined, with activities prescribed and others proscribed, but over the past decade reforms have
been contemplated in all provinces and implemented in some, notably Alberta, British Columbia,
Ontario and Manitoba. The broad thrust has been to increase municipal autonomy, through
laying out general purposes for local government, defining wide spheres of jurisdiction rather
than narrow functions, and conferring “natural person” powers that allow more latitude in
business matters.31 In British Columbia, the Community Charter Act of 2004 reduced provincial
oversight, stipulated that amalgamations would require the consent of affected communities, and
mandated consultation with the Union of BC Municipalities prior to legislating functional or
financial changes.32 In Ontario, amendments have broadly empowered municipalities to foster
“the current and future economic, social and environmental well-being of the municipality.”33
Some argue, however, that aspects of these reforms were designed to promote a corporate model
for local government; moreover, provincial governments still can override municipalities to
achieve their objectives.34
Some special legislation has focused on big cities. The 2003 City of Winnipeg Charter,
for example, grouped the city’s powers into 14 broad categories and allowed it to act in these
areas without prior provincial approval. It also permitted more business activities, strengthened
planning power, and increased the capacity to promote neighbourhood revitalization, which is
very important for Winnipeg.35 The 2006 City of Toronto Act strengthens the office of the
Mayor, widens the scope for levying new taxes, and generally “recognizes the importance of
providing the City with a legislative framework within which the City can build a strong, vibrant
and sustainable city that is capable of thriving in the global economy.”36 Nevertheless, the
provincial government retains its control over the city. For example, while Toronto now can
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establish a mechanism to hear appeals of planning decisions, the Minister of Municipal Affairs
and Housing can withdraw any and all appeals from the city’s purview and send them to the
provincially appointed Ontario Municipal Board.37
While some constraints have been eased, provincial supremacy remains. A summary
judgement about recent reform is that “neither the fundamental purpose of municipal governance
nor the fundamental nature of the constitutional status, functions, or finances of municipal
governments has been radically transformed.”38 Still, municipal autonomy has been expanded
incrementally in several provinces. Moreover, the courts have recently affirmed “benevolent
construction” as a principle in determining the scope of municipalities’ powers, and have adopted
a demanding standard to strike down municipal bylaws for conflicting with provincial or federal
legislation.39 Achieving more power will depend on how the big cities perform as their economic
and demographic weight increases, and on whether citizens identify more strongly with more
active and visible local governments.
Governance role of local government
Canadian local governments are important. In 2005, municipalities spent $42.5 billion and
school boards another $33.1 billion - a combined total of 6.88 percent of GDP or about $2,400
per capita.40 Direct employees of municipalities - 390,650 people - represent 12.5 percent of the
public-sector workforce, and when school boards and local public enterprises are included, this
figure rises to 32.4 percent.41
Municipalities carry out important functions, ones visible to citizens. In all provinces,
municipalities are primarily responsible for the following:42
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- roads and traffic control
- solid waste collection and disposal (except in Prince Edward Island where the province does it)
- land-use planning and regulation and building regulation
- economic development and tourism promotion
- parks, recreation, cultural facilities and libraries
- business licensing and the regulation or provision of cemeteries
- fire protection and emergency planning and preparedness
- fencing, drainage, animal control and pesticide regulation
In addition, urban municipalities fulfill the following functions:
- policing
- public transit
- water purification and distribution
- sewage collection and treatment
It is striking that Canadian municipalities have only very limited responsibilities for social
services, except in Ontario. Public utilities such as electricity and natural gas are provided
through various mechanisms, while tax collection is generally a local responsibility and tax
assessment is mostly done provincially. It should be stressed that municipalities vary
substantially in their organization and service delivery across the provinces, and comparison is
difficult, as it is too within provinces.
Inevitably some functions are shared with other governments. But this normally means
dividing responsibility at the margins of matters, such as city roads (municipal) and highways
(provincial), or sharing costs, rather than joint administration. It is more common for
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municipalities to serve as agents in implementing the will of senior governments. Here, the
federal government is a small player: its policies may shape the problems local governments
have to manage, such as homelessness, but it does relatively little in consort with municipalities,
nor, except in declared emergencies, can it dictate municipal action. But local governments are
used to implement many provincial-government policies. They enforce building codes, for
example, and have to provide policing, libraries, roads and other goods and services according to
provincial guidelines and standards. The list of prescribed activities grows steadily, with
environmental measures and emergency planning being relatively recent additions. Sometimes
these functions are cost-shared with the provinces, but a development that always alarms
municipal authorities is the imposition of new responsibilities without new financing.
Within the range allowed by provincial regulation, local governments have discretion,
and this has generally been increasing to allow more flexibility in implementation. There is a
clear though contested trend towards contracting out services and forming “P3s” - public-private
partnerships.43 This trend has not proceeded as far in most Canadian provinces as in many
countries, because of public skepticism, the power of unionized municipal workforces, and some
results that have been mixed, at best.44 In personnel matters, local governments have long had
autonomy, but the provinces regulate the qualifications of skilled tradespeople and professionals.
They also impose strict rules about police training, and sometimes provide it.
Turning to internal governance, municipal councillors in Canada are elected, either city-
wide or in wards (which sometimes have multiple members). The choice of system is made
locally. In upper-tier governments, such as counties, representatives are normally selected from
those elected in lower-tier municipalities. When upper-tier councillors have been directly
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elected, the result has been more conflict between the two tiers.45
The terms of councils vary between two and four years, as set by provincial legislation.
The franchise is restricted to Canadian citizens, though there is some pressure in larger cities to
allow permanent residents or landed immigrants to vote. The right to vote is no longer restricted
to property owners, but in a majority of provinces Canadians owning property in any
municipality are entitled to vote in each.
Council has final authority over all policy (subject to provincial dictates and court
decisions). Generally, councils legislate by-laws and leave their execution to the municipal staff.
In smaller local governments, councillors can closely supervise staff, while in the cities
functional council committees allow for both deliberation (and recommendations to council) and
oversight of officials. In some cities there is an executive committee. Montreal, for example,
has a very large council - 64 members plus the mayor - but there is an executive committee of 12
which can grant some contracts, manage personnel and real estate, and prepare by-laws and
budgets for presentation to the full council.
Mayors in Canada are formally rather weak. But they are elected directly, and winning a
city-wide vote can confer much legitimacy and power. The current mayor of Toronto, for
example, received over 332,000 votes in the 2006 election - more than any other politician in the
country. In some places the mayor is designated as Chief Executive Officer, but more power
flows from their staff resources and presence on the job (for serving as councillor is a part-time
position, except in most large cities). Mayors also have close relationships with senior
administrators, especially the Chief Administrative Officer. Managerially, the trend in Canada is
towards the CAO system, though most councils maintain direct contact with departmental
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officials.46
Financing the governance role of local government
The framework of local government finance in Canada is established by provincial law.
Typical is Nova Scotia, where the Municipal Government Act contains 544 substantive sections
that establish the structure and functioning of the province’s municipalities. Sections 54-167
cover financial matters such as borrowing, purchasing, financial statements, payment of taxes,
appeals and so on.47 Extensive regulations flesh out the act, and at least eight other statutes cover
aspects of municipal finances. All municipal authority flows from such statutes: Canadian
municipalities have no constitutional revenue-raising powers.
Within these limits, municipalities have some autonomy in taxation policy. In particular,
they control property tax rates, if not the assessment of the base. They also have latitude in
setting user fees for services, though provincial regulatory agencies often supervise the setting of
rates for utilities. What irks ambitious municipal leaders is the refusal of provincial and federal
governments to grant them access to taxes that grow with the economy, notably sales taxes and
the income tax.48
So Canadian municipalities are unusually dependent on the property tax. In 2004,
municipal governments raised $39.7billion or $1,216 per capita. Of this the real property tax
produced 44.2 percent, and property related taxes another 9.1 percent.49 Other taxes brought in
only 1.4 percent. Other own-source income, mostly from sales of goods and fees for services,
accounted for 29.4 percent of revenue, while transfers made up the remaining 15.9 percent. Of
transfers, the greatest part (73.5 percent) was from provincial governments in the form of
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specific-purpose transfers (“conditional grants”), which fund programs where the province
determines how the money will be used. General-purpose provincial grants made up 18.6
percent of transfers. Specific-purpose transfers from the federal government (mostly payments in
lieu of property taxes) made up just 7.9 percent of transfer payments, and only 1.3 percent of
municipal revenues.
There is considerable variation in revenues across the provinces. In Ontario, total
municipal revenues in 2004 were $1,505 per capita. In Quebec, the figure was about $1,023,
similar to the prairie provinces and British Columbia. In the smaller Atlantic provinces, the
range was from $869 in Nova Scotia to $336 in tiny Prince Edward Island because provincial
governments fulfil more functions directly. The Ontario figures stand out because only there do
municipalities still have substantial responsibility for social services - public health, social
assistance and social housing.
These figures have changed over time in important ways. First, albeit from a minuscule
base, federal transfers to municipalities recently have been increasing substantially. Second,
everywhere except in Alberta, specific-purpose transfers from provincial governments dropped
sharply over the 1994-2004 period, for a national decline of 31.4 percent. Hence the financial
autonomy of municipal governments increased, but they have become no less dependent on the
property tax over time.
There are few formal revenue-sharing arrangements between levels of government in
Canada. With the exception of Manitoba, the bases of important taxes like the federal and
provincial sales and income taxes are not shared with municipalities in any Canadian province.
In 2005, though, the federal government undertook to share its tax on gasoline, with transfers to
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municipalities that will reach $1.6billion per year in 2009-10. Gas-tax sharing is also practiced
in Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta, mainly to finance public transit.
Municipal spending makes up 4.12 percent of GDP. Federal spending in 2004 was
$4,649 per capita (19.6 percent of GDP) and the provinces spent $5,780 per capita (24.9 percent
of GDP).50 So is there a fiscal gap in Canada - a “vertical fiscal imbalance”? There certainly is
one in the view of provincial governments: the federal government has excess revenue relative
to its responsibilities, while the provinces have insufficient revenues to meet growing demands,
especially for their major responsibilities of health and education. Provincial governments have
pressed this claim vociferously.51 But the municipalities too argue strenuously that they suffer
from a vertical fiscal imbalance; in particular, they cannot raise enough revenue to close the
“infrastructure deficit” caused by the combination of rapid growth and old, deteriorating
infrastructure.52 As well, very costly expansions of public transit systems in the cities require
support from other levels of government. These needs are genuine, though some have argued
that municipalities could issue more debt (as interest charges make up only 4 percent of local
government spending)53 Others claim that the property tax is under-utilized, and that it may be
less “inelastic” than is sensed by municipal politicians seeking re-election.54 On the other hand,
some municipal financial distress results from provincial policy (housing and social assistance)
and federal policy (immigration), and this lends legitimacy to local governments’ entreaties for
higher transfers.
Local government spending in Canada is under close provincial surveillance.
Municipalities report in detail about their financial flows, and there are limits on municipal debt.
In Ontario, for example, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing sends annually to all
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municipalities their “financial obligation limit.” The limit essentially caps the proportion of the
normal revenue flow that can be devoted to interest payments. If capital projects would cause
payments to exceed the limit, then permission for borrowing must be sought from the Ontario
Municipal Board.55 Other provinces, mindful of municipalities that went bankrupt in the Great
Depression of the 1930s (and of some more recent cases), have comparable controls. But these
controls do not explain the relatively low level of borrowing by Canadian municipalities.
Overall, local self-government has produced very strong financial accountability.
Municipalities report to provincial governments, which supervise them closely. They are also
accountable to taxpayers, who tend to resist increases in taxes. Despite this, it is not obvious that
municipalities are as efficient as they could possibly be. Their workers are heavily unionized, for
example, and in many cases “contracting-out” could reduce costs. But there are forces tending
towards efficiency - intergovernmental competition between municipalities and the supervision
of provincial governments. Whether policy accountability and democratic control of municipal
governments are as strong as financial accountability is another matter.
Supervising the local government by other orders of government
The federal government of Canada exercises no routine supervisory role over local
governments. But when the federal government signs agreements with municipalities there are
arrangements for financial and managerial accountability. These can be quite complex, as in the
cases of the gasoline-tax sharing agreements and special tripartite (municipal-provincial-federal)
agreements.56
In theory, provincial governments have complete authority over local governments. In
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practice, consultation makes the formal override of municipal by-laws rare. Municipal decisions
about planning, land-use and other matters can be appealed to provincial agencies or cabinets,
and to provincial and federal courts.
The strongest sanction that provincial governments can exercise over municipalities -
short of abolishing them through amalgamation - is to take over their administration. This has
happened in cases of bankruptcy, notably during the 1930s when local economies collapsed, and
this still occurs when major employers fail and tax collection becomes problematic. Hence, for
example, the Saskatchewan Municipal Board, which rules on applications to issue long-term
debt, has as its foremost mission “to maintain financial credibility” for the province’s local
governments.57 In Ontario, municipalities in financial distress can be taken over by the Ministry
of Municipal Affairs and Housing. Provincial governments are under no legal obligation to bail
out municipalities, but in practice they do, and healthy municipal credit ratings partly reflect this
expectation. Provincial governments can also intervene when councils become dysfunctional
because of personal or partisan wrangling. This happened recently in Sherwood, Saskatchewan,
when the province dismissed what was left of the council and appointed a public servant to run
the municipality until new elections could be organized.58 But such events are highly
exceptional.
Municipalities have considerable autonomy in carrying out their functions, and in some
provinces the sphere of independent action has grown. But municipal action is always ultimately
constrained by provincial policy, which prescribes many activities and prohibits others. Changes
to the provincial policy framework are perennial, and local governments must ceaselessly adapt
to provincial policy innovations, which arise not only from the main supervisory ministry but
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also from many other departments and agencies, such as those concerned with environmental
protection, agriculture and natural resources, that have responsibilities which impinge on local-
government activities. Moreover, provincial governments occasionally undertake major changes
to their municipal systems. At times there is pressure for amalgamation. In Quebec, for
example, the number of municipalities dropped from 1400 in 1990 to 1147 in 2006, while in
Ontario, amalgamations between 1996 and 2000 reduced the number of municipalities from 850
to 445. Such consolidations are vigorously contested, and there is little clear evidence that
efficiencies either result at all or offset diminished local control if they do.59 Further, at times
functions are reallocated in a wholesale fashion, as in the “local services realignment” exercise
conducted by the Ontario government in the late 1990s.60 Such events make normal governing
difficult to say the least.
Metropolitan regions are closely supervised. In 1988, for example, the government of
Ontario created an Office of the Greater Toronto Area, headed by a deputy minister, to support a
Co-ordinating Committee that comprised officials from all 35 municipal governments in the
region.61 Currently, within the Ontario ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, the Ontario
Growth Secretariat sets planning policy for the entire Greater Golden Horseshoe, which includes
the CMAs of Peterborough, Oshawa, Toronto, Barrie, Hamilton, St. Catherine’s-Niagara,
Brantford, and Kitchener, with a combined population of 7.4million.62 Similarly, in the province
of Quebec, the Contrat de ville de Montréal specifies precise policy engagements by ten
provincial government departments to help manage the sustainable development of the city.63
And in Vancouver, the provincial government’s responsibility for the 2010 winter Olympics and
its interest in Pacific Gateway infrastructure to improve oceanic trade have led it to take a strong
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hand in planning and management.
Intergovernmental relations with other orders of government
Local authorities in Canada are well organized to promote their common interests. There
is one national association, discussed below, but the main basis of organization is provincial. In
each province and territory are associations of municipalities which constitute the principal
mechanism for broad consultation with provincial governments. Municipalities’ primary
relationships always have been with the provincial governments. These relationships cover
almost every aspect of local government activities, and provincial governments clearly dominate.
Relations with the federal government - which are often mediated by provincial governments -
cover a much narrower range of policy areas. There is no regulation involved here, except that
municipalities have to adhere to federal guidelines concerning matters like airport safety and
policing for national security. Normally the relationship involves local governments qualifying
for federal spending programs.
The relationships of municipal governments with “senior” governments - and municipal
leaders strongly dislike the term - are top-down. Local government representatives may insist
that they constitute a co-equal “order” of government, but in reality they are policy takers, not
full partners. On the other hand, some recent initiatives discussed below have involved
municipalities in joint planning, and their associations continue to press for fuller participation in
policy development.
Local-provincial relations
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22
Formally, and practically too, municipal-provincial relations are hierarchical. The
strongest illustrations of this are the amalgamations that have sometimes been forced upon very
resistant local governments, and sweeping provincial moves to reallocate functions. In the
normal course of affairs, provincial officials set and enforce standards that delineate the contours
of municipal activity. But the relationship is not all top-down. Although “creatures of the
provinces” and subject to provincial control, there is a deeper sense in which municipalities are
also a responsibility of provincial governments. It is incumbent on the latter to ensure that the
municipal system is viable, and so provinces must pay attention, ultimately, to municipal
representations about emerging problems. Where big cities are concerned, provincial
governments must be especially solicitous. Not only is their economic vitality of province-wide
concern, but large cities with dynamic mayors can press provincial politicians on particular
issues, with public support. As one analyst of the Ontario scene observed, “[c]urrently, the City
of Toronto has twenty-two members of parliament, twenty-two members of the provincial
legislature, and one mayor. It is not difficult to figure out who will speak with the greatest
authority about the needs of the people of Toronto.”64 Given the paucity of large cities in
individual jurisdictions, one cannot claim that provincial governments have “urban policies,” but
they must be attentive to big-city requirements.
There are a great many avenues for municipal-provincial interaction. The normal channel
for most business is the responsible department. The breadth of these departments’ mandates
varies, and local-government matters are often combined with other branches of activity.65
Where the mandate scope is narrow, and in any case for a lot of other business, municipalities
deal with the many functional departments that affect them - Environment, Recreation, Heritage,
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23
Natural Resources, Transportation, and so on. This official-to-official interaction is by far the
most common form; indeed, it is routine. But there are other avenues.
In larger municipalities, there are specialists in intergovernmental relations, reporting
either to the Chief Administrative Officer or to the Mayor. Their role is to fix problems by
dealing with provincial officials and politicians. At the political level, mayors often
communicate with local members of the provincial legislature. Mayors can sometimes conduct
business with ministers and ministerial aides. Another political channel is to appear before
legislative committees when these bodies are considering measures that affect all municipalities
or particular ones. These are formal occasions, but also lend themselves to quiet lobbying.
To make known their collective views about policy, local governments depend on
provincial associations of municipalities. The associations have expertise, with professional staff
supporting a range of committees concerned with particular issues. Some associations act as
umbrella groups for others. The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO), for example,
includes regional and rural affiliates, an association for municipal administrators, and a bulk
purchasing company. But the associations vary in strength. In some provinces such as Alberta
they are split between urban and rural municipalities, and there are also linguistic groupings in
New Brunswick, Manitoba and Ontario. Undoubtedly municipal size is the major cleavage
among Canadian local governments, and it has led to serious divisions. Both Montreal and
Toronto have dropped out of their provincial association. Within provinces, there are also
specialized associations grouping officials like police chiefs and municipal treasurers, and these
liaise regularly with provincial officials. But it is the major representative associations which
attract politicians’ attention and which have the expertise to convey municipal opinion to the
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24
provincial bureaucracy.
This occurs formally at annual meetings, where association members pass resolutions,
mostly recommending changes to provincial policy. Many of these have already been processed
through committees and the executive and have supporting documentation prepared by staff;
others arise from individual municipalities. For example, the Union of British Columbia
Municipalities at its annual convention routinely deals with dozens of formal resolutions,
concerning issues ranging from tire recycling to the length of councillors’ terms, and in due
course, in a single document, the provincial government formally replies to each one of them.66
At the annual conference of AMO, many provincial ministers appear, and there is an
institutionalized process for local governments to petition to have a delegation meet with them.67
These associations are the main force that Canadian municipalities have organized to represent
their interests to provincial governments, and they are often effective. But of course the province
has the final word.
Overall, the municipal-provincial relationship is sometimes conflictual, and tense
episodes attract much attention, but it must be judged as generally cooperative. Each level of
government will try to rally support for its demands and objectives, but neither one can afford
sustained conflict. The local governments cannot alienate the centre of so much power over
them. But provincial governments need to maintain a healthy municipal system, and for reasons
both administrative and political they must stay attuned to general municipal needs. After all,
municipalities are repositories of expertise in important fields like planning, physical
infrastructure, waste management and recreation. As well, they have established relationships
with all kinds of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are increasingly important
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25
in governance. Politically, ill-advised provincial decisions can galvanize voters, especially in
smaller municipalities, to the peril of provincial politicians. So the provincial governments must
listen. Nevertheless, for prudential reasons and in order to deliver their own policies, they have
traditionally supervised municipal behaviour rather closely. These fetters have irritated,
especially where finances are concerned, but most municipalities quietly adhere to a modest role
of providing services to residents and their properties. So the provincial-municipal relationship
continues to be one of cooperation and incremental change through asymmetric mutual
accommodation.
Local-federal relations
Local government is well organized to deal with the federal government. Although a
federated structure is characteristic of most Canadian associations (including ones interested in
specialized areas of municipal government), the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM)
has direct membership. It represents over 90 percent of all municipalities, and is the main
interlocutor of the federal government on municipal files. It has a large board of directors, an
extensive set of committees dealing with particular policy areas, and a substantial professional
staff. While there are sub-groupings within it, notably the Big City Mayors’ Caucus, the FCM
leadership believes that its considerable power and success derive from its broadly representative
character.
Direct relations between the federal government and local authorities are much less
pervasive than provincial-municipal relations, because of jurisdictional reasons and historic
caution on the federal side about initiatives that could lead to a plethora of demands. (An
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26
exception to federal non-intervention is the National Capital Commission, a public enterprise that
plans and promotes the National Capital District; however, given provincial and municipal
sensitivities, the NCC has operated pragmatically, through consensus and the federal spending
power.68) But there has been much recent change in municipal-federal relations. Due to
restructuring, fiscal strain, and demographic pressures, Canadian municipalities have demanded
assistance and recognition from the federal government. All municipalities want more money,
many seek consultation about policies affecting them, and some want greater autonomy and
power.69 The cities’ case has been advanced by influential think-tanks and business
organizations.70
The federal government responded to early pressures with several initiatives. Programs
to build infrastructure (broadly defined), with funding from all three levels of government, were
launched in 1993.71 When the Liberal government headed by Paul Martin was in power (2003-
2006), the prime minister boldly announced a “New Deal” for cities and communities, with new
respect for the municipal “order” of government, funding for transit, a full rebate of the federal
sales tax on municipal expenditures, and transfers of a portion of the federal gasoline tax.72 As
well, new initiatives addressed homelessness, urban Aboriginal people, the social economy, and
poverty, all requiring federal involvement with municipalities and community groups.73 Finally,
renewed tripartite agreements signed with Vancouver (and British Columbia) and Winnipeg (and
Manitoba) to attack particular problems in those cities seemed to presage the spreading of urban
development agreements to other cities.74
There is no federal ministry responsible for dealing with municipal governments. A
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs was established in the 1970s, but it had little clout in Ottawa
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27
and irritated the provincial governments, so it withered away.75 In 2003, a Cities Secretariat was
established within the federal Privy Council Office, and in 2004 as part of the New Deal there
was established a Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities. Ministry officials
negotiated the gasoline tax arrangements with the provinces, and aimed to create new urban
development agreements. But the Conservative administration led by Stephen Harper (2006-)
rolled the unit into the Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Portfolio, a downgrading that
reflected the government’s general view of federalism - that the federal government should
respect the constitutional division of jurisdiction.76
Another federal department linked to municipalities is Human Resources and Social
Development Canada, which runs many programs focused on community development, labour
and homelessness. These are delivered within municipalities, though implementation often
involves social groups rather than organs of local governments.77 Many other federal
departments interact with municipal governments, often through low-visibility bureaucratic
channels. Indeed, beyond the big intergovernmental initiatives exists a largely unexplored world
of municipal-federal contacts. These occur in many areas of joint interest, such as labour market
and business development, federal property, arts and culture, immigrant settlement and urban
Aboriginal problems. New principles of public management have increased officials’ discretion
at all levels of government, and transgovernmental coalitions can assemble to undertake
particular projects. Local politicians also meet freely with their federal counterparts. Still,
municipalities sometimes complain that there is no central portal for dealing with the federal
government.
Provincial governments mediate the contacts between “their” municipalities and Ottawa.
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28
At one extreme is Quebec, which sequesters its local governments. By law, no municipal
government can enter agreements with Canada, other provinces or other countries without the
authorization of the provincial government - and this is enforced.78 It helps municipalities’
bargaining power while preserving the province’s sovereign prerogatives. (Nevertheless,
Quebec’s position does not preclude fruitful interaction, as in greater Montreal, where efforts to
attract investment and stimulate key sectors are co-ordinated through Montréal International, an
organization that has five provincial and five federal ministries as partners, along with many
municipalities and firms.79)
Quebec is special, but all provinces mediate municipal-federal relations. While
constitutional power gives them the upper hand in these dealings, the federal purse and municipal
demands make tri-level bargaining more complex. Depending on the province’s situation and
the policy at issue, provinces may simply monitor municipal-federal interactions. Or, they can
advocate for municipalities, broker between the parties, regulate the interaction, or join as a
partner - and this can be done through tripartite mechanisms or by the province alone through
line departments or central agencies, including the premier’s office.80 Tri-level negotiations are
not a simple game in Canada.
The governments of large cities have separate relations with the federal government.
Mayors and senior officials have access to top-ranking federal bureaucrats, and they also can
meet with ministers. As well, a longstanding federal tradition is to name a “political minister”
for each province to handle sensitive issues, and big-city politicians use this channel; in fact,
recent governments have designated political ministers with special responsibilities for Montreal
and the Greater Toronto Area.
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29
The rising demands of all municipalities and the increasing assertiveness of the big cities
and their allies have posed challenges for federal governments. But Canadian local government
is certainly not a full partner in the federation, despite the promises of the New Deal period.
Provinces control municipalities, and there are good, self-interested reasons for the federal
government to cleave to this. Naturally, federal governments want their activities to have a high
profile in municipalities and especially big cities (for currently, 85 of 308 House of Commons
seats are in the CMAs of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver), but this need not require much
interaction with municipal governments per se.
Essentially, then, intergovernmental relations in Canada still means provincial-municipal
interactions on the one hand and federal-provincial ones on the other. Where this distinction has
been breached, in the view of some observers, a flexible and “place-based” federal orientation
has produced better policies, ones more suited than usual to local conditions.81 A parallel
argument is that new federal transfers are but the harbinger of an imperative national effort to
keep Canadian cities competitive.82 So intergovernmental relations may continue to become
more dense and widespread. But there are costs attached to tri-level policy making.
Negotiations can delay policy and generate high transactions costs, and management structures
can be overly complex, especially when NGOs are involved. Accountability is an issue when
responsibility is widely shared. New federal initiatives involving municipalities can create both
federal-provincial tensions and dissatisfaction within the provincial-municipal relationship
(especially when large and small municipalities are treated differently). In the end, Canadian
municipalities may serve themselves best not by approaching the federal government but by
focusing demands for money and power upon their jurisdictional masters - the provinces.
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30
Political culture of local governance
Municipal politics in Canada has a relatively low profile. This stems in part from the
sense that local governments merely exist to provide a limited range of rather banal services, a
perception that is weaker of course in the big cities. As well, there are few political parties
operating at the local level. Municipal parties exist in Quebec, encouraged by provincial
legislation, and in British Columbia, where politics are polarized between left and right, and
there have been parties and party-like “slates” of candidates in several other cities.83 But the
Canadian party system is remarkable because the major federal and provincial parties are largely
distinct, even when they share the same label, and because the system does not incorporate
municipal politics. So the tradition of non-partisanship prevails, even though many local
politicians are known to be members of federal or provincial parties, and others are recruited by
parties to seek provincial or federal office.84 Non-partisanship probably diminishes electoral
participation and certainly weakens collective accountability; as well, intergovernmental relations
lack the partisan connections which can sometimes smooth relations and sometimes obstruct
them, but which always help organize them.
The public’s interest in local elections is relatively low. Turnout rates vary and no
centralized statistics are available, but on average perhaps 35 - 45 percent of the electorate votes.
This is substantially below federal and provincial rates, which have typically been about 60 - 75
percent.
But there are other participatory mechanisms. Because Canada is a developed and stable
society, municipalities contain dense webs of voluntary associations - NGOs - through which
people can participate in governance. There are business associations, churches, service clubs,
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31
recreational associations, and groups representing many special interests. The NGOs are vehicles
for citizen input into policy making. (They are also conduits for policy implementation, because
they harness volunteer energy and they sometimes assemble people who are the objects of policy;
hence many social policy initiatives bypass municipal governments altogether and work through
NGOs.) Individuals also have ample opportunities to express their views. Contact with
politicians and officials is simple and personal in smaller municipalities. Committees of council
meet publicly to discuss issues, and residents often can speak their mind. When budgets are
presented and community plans and zoning are at issue, more extensive participatory exercises
occur, though turnout at these sessions is often low. Participatory opportunities are exploited
most by business interests (especially developers), special-interest groups (like patrons of cultural
facilities), “ratepayers’ associations” (which aim for low taxes), and residents opposing particular
development projects. Broad and sustained engagement in civic issues is not the norm in
Canada.
In Canadian politics, gender is always an issue. Despite expectations that more women
would stand for election and be more successful at the local level than at others, this does not
seem to be true.85 Obstacles remain, including unequal sharing of domestic work and “old boys
networks” that groom male candidates. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities and local
groups are campaigning for increased representation of women.86 Visible minorities are also
under-represented in municipal government; moreover, urban constituencies in Canada, where
most recent immigrants live, contain more voters than the over-represented rural areas, so
attenuating the weight of visible minorities.87
Municipal political culture does affect intergovernmental relations in Canada. Local
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32
politicians tend to be cautious and oriented towards the status quo, as long as economic growth
proceeds. In small and medium-sized municipalities, which emphasize non-partisan service
provision, provincial governments are regarded with a mixture of deference and irritation. For
most municipalities, the federal government is far away. The provincial associations and the
FCM are effective and strongly supported, but demands necessarily reflect the broadest possible
consensus and they are not visible to citizens. The big-city mayors are outspoken, but
intermittently and non-ideologically. For most municipalities, therefore, intergovernmental
relations are subdued and often technical, not political, with the most common stance being one
of deserving supplication.
Emerging issues and trends
Municipal governments in Canada and their relations with the provincial and federal
governments are relatively stable. This is because of long tradition and because the system has
worked reasonably well; moreover, the economic environment has been highly favourable for 60
years, with only occasional recessions and none since 1992. Canada is a fortunate country.
The biggest issue facing municipalities, in their view, is a shortfall of resources. They
depend heavily on the property tax for revenue, and municipal politicians believe that tax
increases cause hardship to some, reduce competitiveness, and are politically damaging. So they
have turned to other revenue sources, and they have argued the case for larger transfers from
other levels of government. The federal government responded with despite significant new
transfers, but those came when the “cities agenda” was a national priority. More federal funding
is unlikely, so inevitably the municipalities will turn towards their provincial masters. Recently,
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33
only the government of Quebec has produced a more generous system, though others have
provided some access to new revenue sources. In the medium term, if municipal needs keep
growing, provincial governments will probably extend more financial aid. Should one provincial
government make a substantial move, the pressure on others to do the same would be intense.88
Another major problem is coping with disparities among municipalities. For a very long
time, the legislative framework for local government was essentially uniform in each province.
But now conditions have diverged. In the cities, there is growth pressure from large immigrant
flows, which bodes well for their economic futures but creates social, economic and
environmental stresses. In contrast are declining towns and rural municipalities, where there
exist major problems of sustainability. Overall, a move is underway to grant cities increasing
autonomy and access to revenue sources. As legal frameworks broaden, it is likely that local
authorities will occupy new functions and revenue sources when they are ready to do so, perhaps
even tackling the challenges of sprawl, immigrant integration and poverty. The process may be
one of “opting in” to new powers, which is quite in line with the tradition of incremental
change.89 The distress of communities in decline, however, will not be solved by more powers.
Money is required.
In the longer term, if the demographic and economic dominance of big municipalities -
city-regions - continues to increase, Canadians may debate the roles and relative powers of cities
and provinces. Suggestions have been made that constitutional changes should enshrine a new
status and powers for cities, but this is highly improbable, as there is little appetite for any
constitutional amendment in Canada. An alternative view is that functions necessarily will be
devolved to economically dominant cities from the federal and especially the provincial
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34
governments: this could lead to an “hourglass federalism,” with strong municipalities and a
strong centre.90 But there is no reason in principle to accept this economic determinism; instead,
more assertive and powerful municipalities may evolve as citizens increasingly identify with
their cities. In practice, however, there is much evidence that provincial power, cemented in the
constitution, is shaping the future of city-regions. Quebec governments have forced
amalgamations and allowed de-amalgamations; the province of British Columbia runs the two
greatest projects afoot there; and Toronto’s new powers pale beside sweeping provincial
initiatives to manage development in the Greater Golden Horseshoe region. In the face of city-
regions’ economic strength and swelling, loyal populations, the provinces will not fade away. On
the contrary, their pivotal role in the Canadian intergovernmental system will continue long into
the future.
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35
NOTES
1.Larry S. Bourne and Damaris Rose, “The Changing Face of Canada: the Uneven Geographies
of Population and Social Change,” Canadian Geographer 45:1 (Spring 2001): 105-19.
2.Thomas J. Courchene, A State of Minds: Towards a Human Capital Future for Canadians
(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2001).
3.Canada, Statistics Canada, Population and dwelling counts, for Canada and census subdivisions
(municipalities) with 5,000-plus population, 2006 and 2001 censuses - 100% data, at
http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/popdwell/Table.cfm?T=307&S=3&O=D&RPP=
699, accessed 25 June 2007.
4.“Urban” is defined as an area with a population of at least 1,000 and density of at least 400
people per square kilometer, a definition which includes rather small towns.
5.Canada, Statistics Canada, Portrait of the Canadian Population in 2006, 2006 Census,
Population and Dwelling Counts, Catalogue no. 97-550-XIE, March 2007.
6.Canada, Statistics Canada, 2001 Census of Population (Provinces, Census Divisions,
Municipalities), 2001 Languages, Mobility and Migration, at
http://estat.statcan.ca/cgi-win/CNSMCGI.EXE?Lang=E&DBSelect=SD2001_4, accessed 25
June 2007.
7.Canada, Statistics Canada, Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure-Based (Quarterly), at
http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/econ41.htm, accessed 25 June 2007. All figures are in current
$US.
8.Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Economic Observer: Historical Statistical Supplement
2005/06, Catalogue No. 11-210XIB, July 2006, Table 4.
9.Canada, Statistics Canada, Tables 380-0016 and 380-0022, E-stat Online database, through
----------------------- Page 36-----------------------
36
http://cansim2.statcan.ca/cgi-win/CNSMCGI.EXE, accessed 26 June 2007.
10.Canada, Statistics Canada, Public Sector Statistics: Financial Management System 2005-
2006, Catalogue 68-213 XIE, July 2006, Tables 5-1 and 1-7.
11.For basic information on Canadian federalism, see the Gobal Dialogue on Federalism Series,
all published in Montreal for Forum of Federations by McGill-Queen’s University Press: Rainer
Knopf and Anthony Sayers, “Canada,” Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal
Countries ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr, v.1 (2005), pp. 103-142; Richard Simeon and
Martin Papillon, “Canada,” Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed.
Akhtar Majeed, et. al. v.2 (2006), pp. 91-122; Thomas O. Hueglin, “Canada,” Legislative,
Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries, ed. Katy Le Roy, et. al. v.3 (2006), pp.
101-134, Robin Boadway, “Canada,” The Practice of Fiscal Federalism, ed. Anwar Shah, v.4
(2007), pp. 98-124.
12.Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
13.Robert A. Young, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1995).
14.This tension is explored throughout a basic text on Canadian municipal government: see C.
th
Richard Tindal and Susan Nobes Tindal, Local Government in Canada, 6 ed. (Toronto: Nelson,
2004). Another useful text is Katherine A. Graham and Susan D. Phillips with Allan M.
Maslove, Urban Governance in Canada: Representation, Resources, and Restructuring (Toronto:
Harcourt Canada, 1998).
15.See Kenneth Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1954), pp. 19-47.
16.Robert A. Young, “Remembering Equal Opportunity: Clearing the Undergrowth in New
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37
Brunswick,” Canadian Public Administration 30:1 (Spring 1987): 88-102.
17.Mary W. Rowe, ed. Toronto: Considering Self-Government (Owen Sound, Ontario: The
Ginger Press, 2000).
18.Statistics Canada, source as in Note 3. The metropolitan areas of these cities, which
sometimes share their interests, are even weightier as a percentage of provincial populations:
Winnipeg - 60.5 percent, Halifax - 40.8 percent, Calgary - 32.8 percent, Montreal - 48.2 percent,
and Toronto - 42.0 percent.
19.See
http://www.edmonton.ca/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_265_210_0_43/http%3B/CMS
Server/COEWeb/city+government/civic+agencies/list+of+civic+agencies/, accessed 26 June
2007. Typically such agencies are controlled by the municipality, but their Boards of Directors
often include ordinary citizens, experts, and representatives of business and non-governmental
organizations.
20.For the general argument contrasting special-purpose and multi-purpose authorities, see Lisbet
Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level
Governance,” American Political Science Review 97:2 (May 2003): 233-43.
21.See http://www.intrd.gov.nl.ca/intrd/economicboards.htm, accessed 15 May 2008.
22.Andrew Sancton, “Metropolitan and Regional Governance,” Urban Policy Issues: Canadian
Perspectives, 2nd ed., eds. Edmund P. Fowler and David Siegel (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford
University Press, 2002), pp. 54-68.
23.Andrew Sancton, “Fusions et défusions municipales au Québec et en Ontario,” Le parti
Libéral: Enquête sur les réalisations du gouvernement Charest, eds. François Pétry, Éric
Bélanger, et Louis M. Imbeau, (Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006), pp. 321-38.
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38
24.Pierre Hamel, “Municipal Reform in Quebec: The Trade-off between Centralization and
Decentralization,” Municipal Reform in Canada, eds. Joseph Garcea and Edward C. LeSage Jr.
(Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 149-73. It should be noted that
Montreal is divided into arrondissements (boroughs), each with a mayor and council, so the
governance structure there is particularly complex.
25.For arrangements in the northern Territories see Katherine A.H. Graham, “Municipal Reform
in the Northern Territories: Now for Something Different,” Municipal Reform, pp. 269-86.
26.Teresa M. Dust, “The Impact of Aboriginal Land Claims and Self-governance on Canadian
Municipalities,” Canadian Public Administration 40:3 (Fall 1997): 481-94.
27.Signa A. Daum Shanks, “Municipalities and First Nations Reserves: What’s the
Connection?,” Municipal World (January 2007): 31-2, 42.
28.Joseph Garcea and Ken Pontikes, “Federal-Municipal-Provincial Relations in Saskatchewan:
Provincial Roles, Approaches, and Mechanisms,” Canada: The State of the Federation 2004
Municipal-Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada, eds. Robert Young and Christian Leuprecht
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), pp. 349-50.
29.Canada, Constitution Act 1867, Section 92(8).
30.David Siegel, “Recent Changes in Provincial-Municipal Relations in Ontario: A New Era or a
Missed Opportunity?” Canada: The State of the Federation 2004, pp. 181-97. See also David
Siegel and C. Richard Tindal, “Changing the Municipal Culture: From Comfortable
Subordination to Assertive Maturity,” Parts I and II, Municipal World, (March and April 2006),
pp. 37-40 and 13-17.
31.Joseph Garcea and Edward C. LeSage Jr., “Municipal Reform Agendas and Initiatives:
Analytical Framework and Overview,” Municipal Reform, pp. 3-22.
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39
32.Patrick J. Smith and Kennedy Stewart, “Local Government Reform in British Columbia,
1991-2005: One Oar in the Water,” Municipal Reform, pp. 25-56.
33.Ontario, “Municipal Act”, Statutes of Ontario 2001, Chapter 25, Section 2. c.
34.Smith and Stewart, “Local Government Reform,” 38-46; Christopher Leo and Mark Piel,
“Municipal Reform in Manitoba: Homogenizing, Empowering, and Marketing Municipal
Government,” Municipal Reform, pp. 106-26.
35.Ibid.
36.Ontario, Statutes of Ontario 2006, Chapter 11, Schedule A, Preamble. The title of the act is
the “Stronger City of Toronto for a Stronger Ontario Act.”
37.Ibid., Section 115. 16.
38.Garcea and LeSage, “Municipal Reform Agendas,” 16-17.
39.Canada, Supreme Court of Canada, Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2000 SCC 13
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 342. See also 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson
(Town), 2001 SSC 40 [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 upholding the power of a municipality to regulate for
health purposes. On the other hand, the courts have not taken an expansive view about municipal
revenue raising powers, by protecting provincial control over direct taxation and requiring that
user fees fairly reflect the cost of the service provided.
40.Statistics Canada, source as in Note 9, and http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/govt34a.htm,
accessed 15 May 2008.
41.Canada, Statistics Canada, Table 282-0012, E-stat Online database, and
http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/govt54a.htm, accessed 26 June 2007.
42.Andrew Sancton, “Introduction,” Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces, eds. Andrew
Sancton and Robert Young (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).
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40
43.See British Columbia, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Public Private Partnership: A Guide for
Local Government (Victoria: n.p., May 1999), at
http://www.cserv.gov.bc.ca/lgd/policy_research/library/public_private_partnerships.pdf, accessed
26 June 2007.
44.See a study commissioned by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities: Pierre J. Hamel,
Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) and Municipalities: Beyond Principles, a Brief Overview of
Practices (Montreal: INRS-UCS, 2007).
45.Andrew Sancton, “Metropolitan and Regional Governance,” p. 60.
46.Tindal and Tindal, Local Government in Canada, pp. 277-84.
47.Nova Scotia, Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1998, c.18.
48.Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Big City Mayors’ Caucus, Our Cities, Our Future:
Addressing the Fiscal Imbalance in Canada’s Cities Today, June 2006, at
http://www.fcm.ca/english/documents/bcmcfinal.pdf, accessed 27 June 2007. See also Harry M.
Kitchen and Enid Slack, “Special Study: New Finance Options for Municipal Governments,”
Canadian Tax Journal 51:6 (June 2003): 2215-2275. An exception to this pattern is Manitoba,
where 4.15 percent of personal and corporate income tax is distributed to municipalities.
49.Statistics Canada, CanSim II Tables 385-0024 and 385-0004, at
http://cansim2.statcan.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?LANG=E&RegTkt=&C2Sub=&C2DB=PRD&R
OOTDIR=CII/&LangFldr=&ResultTemplate=CII/CII_FLst&CIITables=3059, accessed 27 June
2007.
50.Ibid., Tables 385-0001, 051-0001, 379-0017 and 379-0020, through
http://cansim2.statcan.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?CANSIMFile=CII/CII_1_E.HTM&RootDir=CII/
&LANG=E, accessed 27 June 2007.
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51.Canada, The Council of the Federation, Advisory Panel on Fiscal Imbalance, Reconciling the
Irreconcilable: Addressing Canada’s Fiscal Imbalance, March 2006, at
http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/keyinitiatives/AdvisoryPanel.html, accessed 27 June 2007.
52.Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Building Prosperity from the Ground Up: Restoring
Municipal Fiscal Balance, June 2006, at
http://www.fcm.ca/english/media/backgrounders/fiscalim.pdf, accessed 27 June 2007.
53.Richard M. Bird and Duan-jie Chen, “Federal Finance and Fiscal Federalism: the Two Worlds
of Canadian Public Finance,” Canadian Public Administration 41:1 (Spring 1998): 51-74.
54.Jack M. Mintz and Tom Roberts, Running on Empty: A Proposal to Improve City Finances,
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, No. 226, February 2006.
55.Government of Ontario, Ontario Regulation 403/02, under the Municipal Act 2001, made 18
December 2002, at
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/DBLaws/Source/Regs/English/2002/R02403_e.htm
56.See, for example, Canada, Infrastructure Canada, Canada-New Brunswick, “Agreement on the
Transfer of Federal Gas Tax Revenues Under the New Deal for Cities and Communities 2005-
2015,” 25 November 2005, at
http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/communities-collectivites/agreements-ententes/gas-essence_tax/g
t_can_nb_e.shtml, accessed 27 June 2007; Canada, Western Economic Diversification Canada,
“Canada-Manitoba-Winnipeg Agreement for Community and Economic Development,” 20 May
2004, at http://www.wd.gc.ca/ced/urban/agreements/may2004/default_e.asp, both accessed 27
June 2007.
57.Government of Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Municipal Board, Annual Report 2004, n.d., p.
4, at http://www.smb.gov.sk.ca/documents/ar_2004.pdf, accessed 27 June 2007.
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58.John Intini, “That’s enough arguing. You’re all out of here,” Maclean’s, 5 March 2007, p. 33.
59.Pierre J. Hamel et al. “Les administrations municipales au Québec: organisation,
fonctionnement et tendances” and David Siegel, “Ontario: a Province in Steady Transition,”
Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces; see also Andrew Sancton,"Reducing Costs by
Consolidating Municipalities: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario," Canadian Public
Administration 39:3 (Autumn 1996): 267-89, and Sancton, Merger Mania: The Assault on Local
Government (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000).
60.Katherine A. Graham and Susan D. Phillips, “‘Who Does What= in Ontario: The Process of
Provincial-Municipal Disentanglement,” Canadian Public Administration 41:2 (Summer 1998):
175-209.
61.Tindal and Tindal, Local Government in Canada, p. 109.
62.See Government of Ontario, Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, Places to Grow:
Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2006),
and information at http://www.pir.gov.on.ca/english/growth/contact.htm, accessed 27 June 2007.
63.Ville de Montréal et Gouvernement du Québec, Contrat de Ville de Montréal, 2003-2007,
2003, at http://www2.ville.montreal.qc.ca/ocpm/pdf/PD05/3j.pdf., accessed 26 June 2007.
64.David Siegel, “Recent Changes in Provincial-Municipal Relations in Ontario,” 191.
65.For Ontario - Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing; British Columbia - Community
Services (Local Government Department); Nova Scotia - Service Nova Scotia and Municipal
Relations; Manitoba - Intergovernmental Affairs (Municipal Finance and Advisory Services);
Nunavut - Department of Community and Government Services, and so on.
66.See the two documents at http://www.civicnet.bc.ca/siteengine/ActivePage.asp?PageID=208,
accessed 27 June 2007.
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67.This is arranged by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. See
http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page4760.aspx, accessed 27 June 2007.
68.David L. A. Gordon, “Ottawa-Hull and Canberra: Implementation of Capital City Plans,”
Canadian Journal of Urban Research, 11:2 (Winter 2002): 179-211,
69.Robert Young, “The Politics of Paying for Cities in Canada,” Paying for Cities: The Search
for Sustainable Municipal Revenues, ed. Paul Boothe (Edmonton: The Institute for Public
Economics, 2003), pp. 83-97. Demands for funding and federal assistance also surfaced in the
late 1800s, the 1930s and the 1960s.
70.TD Bank Financial Group, A Choice Between Investing in Canada’s Cities or Disinvesting in
Canada’s Future, TD Economics Special Report, 22 April 2002; Toronto City Summit Alliance,
Enough Talk: An Action Plan for the Toronto Region, April 2003; Conference Board of Canada,
Mission Possible: Successful Canadian Cities, The Canada Project, Final Report, Volume III,
February 2007.
71.Loleen Berdahl, “The Federal Urban Role and Federal-Municipal Relations,” Canada: The
State of the Federation 2004, pp. 25-43.
72.Paul Martin, “Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin to the Conference of the Federation of
Canadian Municipalities,” St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, 5 June 2005.
73.Neil Bradford, Whither the Federal Urban Agenda? A New Deal in Transition, Canadian
Policy Research Networks, Family Network, Research Report F/65, February 2007.
74.For a detailed study of the Vancouver Agreement, see Michael Mason, Collaborative
partnerships for urban development: a study of the Vancouver Agreement [online]. London, LSE
Research Online at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/692/, accessed 27 June 2007. New agreements,
smaller in scope, were signed with the province of Saskatchewan and the cities of Regina and
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Saskatoon in 2005.
75.Lionel D. Feldman and Katherine A. Graham, Bargaining for Cities (Montreal: Institute for
Research on Public Policy, 1979).
76.Robert Young, “Open Federalism and Canadian Municipalities,” in Keith G. Banting et al.,
Open Federalism: Interpretations, Significance (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations, 2006), pp. 7-24.
77.Neil Bradford, Place-based Public Policy: Towards a New Urban and Community Agenda for
Canada, Canadian Policy Research Networks, Family Network, Research Report F/51, March
2005.
78.Québec, Revised Statutes of Québec (Québec: Éditeur Officiel, 2002), Chapter M-30, “An
Act Respecting the Ministère du Conseil Exécutif,” Section 3.11.
79.Montreal International, Partner in Greater Montréal’s Prosperity - Report of Activities 2006,
at http://www.montrealinternational.com/docs/2007/Rapport2006En.pdf, accessed 27 June 2007.
80.This is based on Garcea and Pontikes, “Federal-Municipal-Provincial Relations in
Saskatchwan.” These authors also provide a useful (and unique) compendium of collaborative
programs and projects in the province of Saskatchewan.
81.Christopher Leo, “Deep Federalism: Respecting Community Difference in National Policy,”
Canadian Journal of Political Science 36:2 (September 2006): 481-506.
82.Thomas J. Courchene, “Global Futures for Canada’s Global Cities,” Institute for Research on
Public Policy, Policy Matters 8:2, June 2007.
83.Tindal and Tindal, Local Government in Canada, pp. 315-31.
84.In the current House of Commons, 39% of the 306 sitting members had experience in local
government, usually as councillors and mayors but sometimes as members of school boards:
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found through
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Lists/ParliamentarianAge.aspx?Menu=HOC-Bio&Chamber=03d
93c58-f843-49b3-9653-84275c23f3fb, accessed 27 June 2007.
85.See Elisabeth Gidengil and Richard Vengroff, “Representational Gains of Canadian Women
or Token Growth? The Case of Quebec’s Municipal Politics,” Canadian Journal of Political
Science 30:3 (September 1997): 513-37.
86.The FCM estimates that women make up 21.7 percent of all municipal councillors, just
slightly higher than their proportion in the current House of Commons. See FCM, Women in
Municipal Politics, at http://www.fcm.ca/english/policy/big.pdf, and for information on the FCM
campaign, see http://www.fcm.ca/english/policy/women.html both accessed 27 June 2007.
87.Michael Pal and Sujit Choudhry, Is Every Ballot Equal? Visible-Minority Vote Dilution in
Canada, IRPP Choices, 13:1, January 2007.
88.Courchene, “Global Futures,” p. 33.
89.Kari Roberts and Roger Gibbins, Apples and Oranges? Urban Size and the Municipal-
Provincial Partnership, Discussion Paper, Canada West Foundation, October 2005.
90.Thomas J. Courchene, “Hourglass Federalism - How the Feds Got the Provinces to Run Out
of Money in a Decade of Liberal Budgets,” Policy Options 25:4 (April 2004): 12-17.
