CANADA: PROVINCES RULE

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CANADA: PROVINCES RULE


Robert Young

The story of municipal government within the Canadian federation is largely one of

success. Stable local governments administer a wide range of services and provide public goods,

within a framework of democratic accountability. Canada has a long tradition of local control of

municipal governments, and these generally function adequately and efficiently. But there are

always strains in the system, and those currently manifest have produced the most lively debate

in decades. Despite pressures and some evolution, though, the essence of the system remains

unaltered: the provincial governments control municipalities and what they do.

It is inaccurate to speak of “the system” of municipal government. The defining

institutional characteristic of Canadian municipalities is their constitutional position as a

competence of the provincial governments. As the well worn phrase has it, they are “creatures of

the provinces.” Hence there are ten provincial-municipal systems in Canada (with three more in

the northern territories of Yukon, Nunavut and the Northwest Territories), and there have been

sharp differences across these systems. But there have been commonalities too, and one political

constant is the chafing of local governments against constraints imposed by provincial

governments, and irritation with unilateral action from above. Led by the larger cities, local

governments have sought more autonomy and - a universal demand - more resources. Recently,

they have also turned to the federal government in Ottawa, seeking funds and a “seat at the table”

to discuss policies important at the municipal level.

Municipal issues have risen on the Canadian policy agenda in part because of

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demographic pressures. Immigration from abroad is producing explosive growth in the larger

centres, while smaller, peripheral municipalities must cope with population stagnation or

decline.1 Also there is a sense that cities are vital for national competitiveness in the globalized

economy, as loci of human capital and innovation.2 In urban centres, citizens’ concerns about

pollution, crime, poverty and inadequate infrastructure resonate with politicians at all levels of

government. Finally, as the big agglomerations grow steadily, interdependencies multiply, and

the question of how to deal with them becomes more important.

So several issues are prominent in Canada. How can local governments get more money

and more autonomy? How should senior governments deal with municipalities that vary greatly

in size and policy capacity? How should the provincial and federal governments help with the

problems of the metropoles - social exclusion, poverty, the cost of infrastructure and sprawl -

while mitigating the problems of decline in the periphery - unemployment and costly services? Is

it sensible to use multilevel approaches, despite their complexity, or are disentanglement and

clear accountability preferable? These are some of the issues addressed throughout this chapter.

Introductory overview

Canada is a vast country. It covers 9,017,700 square kilometers. With a population in

2006 of 31,612,897, the country seems very sparsely settled, with 3.51 inhabitants per square

kilometer.3 But this is misleading, because in effect Canada is a long, thin country, with about

two-thirds of the population located within 200km of the southern border. In fact, fully 80

percent of Canadians live in urban areas, with almost 23 percent in the big metropolitan areas of

Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.4 But substantial numbers live in the towns and rural parts of

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the Atlantic provinces, in the northern mining and forestry towns and the fertile southern farm

regions of Ontario and Quebec, across the agricultural Prairies, and in the resource-producing

areas of central and northern British Columbia. There are also over 100,000 people in the three

northern territories.5

Canada has always been a settler country. The indigenous population comprises many

Indian bands - First Nations - throughout the south, and the Inuit peoples of the north. But they

are now small minorities in a population derived from the first French settlers (1604-1750), and

waves of American Loyalists (1774-1800), English and Scots (early 1800s), Irish (mid-1800s),

and Western Europeans and Ukranians (1890-1920). Recent settlers have come from all over the

world, and Canada, with annual immigration rates just below 1 percent of the total population, is

highly multicultural. French remains the mother tongue of 23 percent of Canadians and English

of 58 percent, while Chinese, German, Italian and Punjabi each make up well over 1 percent.6

Canada is a rich country. In 2006, gross domestic product was about $41,200 per capita.7

An advanced industrial country, with 63 percent of business-sector GDP arising from services, it

is also resource-rich: manufacturing accounts for 17.l percent of total GDP, but primary-sector

activities in agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, mining and energy account for another 14

percent.8 Over the past decades in Canada, the relative fiscal presence of government has

diminished, as the federal government’s outlay was 19.35 percent of GDP in 1980 but just 16.05

percent in 2005, while other governments’ shares were stable.9 Government debt per capita in

Canada is about $20,000, with the federal government responsible for about two-thirds of this

total, which has been declining since 1997.10

At the senior levels, Canada has a relatively simple structure of government.11 It remains

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a constitutional monarchy. The Queen is the Head of State, represented in Canada by the

Governor General and provincially by Lieutenant Governors. The system is Parliamentary,

unicameral in the provinces and with an appointed Senate complementing the House of

Commons in Ottawa. The legislatures are elected through the single-member plurality

mechanism, which usually produces strong majority governments. The position of Prime

Minister is particularly powerful in the Canadian context.12 The checks on executive power

come from opposition parties, the Senate, the media, and the courts, which have expansively

interpreted the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms since it became part of the constitution

in 1982. As well, there is an alert and generally well educated citizenry.

Since World War II, Canada has had a relatively stable three-party system, with the

mainstream Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties alternating power, while the New

Democratic Party, a social-democratic formation, retained substantial support. In 1993 this

system fragmented, but now has returned to past form, except that the Quebec-based Bloc

Québécois, a sovereigntist party, has won a majority of seats in the province since 1993, and the

major centre-right party is now the Conservative Party. Overall, the Canadian political system is

comparatively stable, with the major force to the contrary being the sovereigntist movement in

Quebec.13 Politics traditionally revolves around the cleavages of region and ideology more than

class, while issues of social cohesion and other urban problems have emerged more recently.

History, structures and institutions of local government

Local government in Canada is wonderfully complex. Most Canadians have a core

understanding of it as an authority that operates over a limited territory, providing a range of

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services to inhabitants. But the concept is contested. Some citizens and analysts and participants

stress how local governments provide services and accommodate the choices made by

individuals and firms; others emphasize local democracy and the representation of citizens’

preferences about the shape of their community.14

There is a wide range of local government structures in Canada, reflecting different

provincial conditions. But a core model from which variations can be understood is the Ontario

system, instituted by the Municipal Act of 1849, which was both an administrative solution and

the culmination of a struggle for democratic control of governing institutions. The basic units,

equipped with elected councils, were the townships, towns and villages (all “lower-tier” entities),

with “upper-tier” county governments carrying out more general functions. The Act also

provided for self-governing “separated towns” and cities, which did not share functions with

counties. Originally, this system was largely reproduced in other provinces, with variations about

towns being included in counties and about how county councillors were chosen. Where

populations were sparse, as in most of Western Canada, there was only one tier, and local

authorities had more limited powers.15

These structures suited agrarian societies where municipalities carried out a few basic

functions, even in the commercial centres. After the late 1800s, urbanization and

industrialization provided the usual challenges about public health, housing and transit, and later

the transition to an advanced industrial society, overwhelmingly urban, brought new concerns

about infrastructure, social diversity, and environmental sustainability. Structural reforms

ensued, but it is remarkable that much of the basic system remains intact.

Local government does not blanket Canada. In rural areas, several provincial

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governments provide some services, and direct government of them has occurred, as when New

Brunswick abolished its counties in 1967.16 Large tracts of “Crown Land” across the country are

owned and administered by the provinces. Elsewhere, local government prevails. Nowhere does

it enjoy the larger powers of provinces, as do the German city-states, though occasional demands

for provincial status are heard.17 However some cities are predominant within their provinces:

Winnipeg makes up 55.2 percent of the population of Manitoba, and Halifax (31.0 percent),

Calgary (30.0 percent), Montreal (21.5 percent), and Toronto (20.2 percent) comprise large

proportions of Nova Scotia, Alberta, Quebec, and Ontario respectively.18 This weight confers

political strength, despite municipalities’ constitutional weaknesses.

Municipalities are not the only components of local government in Canada, for most have

spun off agencies, boards and commissions that fulfil specialized functions. The most ubiquitous

are school boards, normally elected. Originally their boundaries approximated those of

municipalities, but the drive to attain economies of scale and deliver specialized services

produced massive consolidation. The public, English-language system in Ontario has only 56

school boards and authorities, while New Brunswick has 15 and Nova Scotia only eight. Other

specialized agencies provide many services. Edmonton, Alberta, is an extreme example: while

an extensive public transit system is run by a department of the municipal government, there are

agencies for public health, housing, economic development, police, libraries and non-profit

housing, as well as a public enterprise that handles water supply, wastewater, and electrical

generation, transmission and distribution.19 Agencies in other cities manage parks, recreation,

planning and tourism. Some of these were created in order to insulate administration from

political pressures (in policing, for example) and to allow expertise to dominate (as in public

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health).

In other cases, flexible, single-purpose agencies allow for inter-municipal co-operation to

capture externalities and economies of scale.20 In fact most municipalities engage in joint

institutions and cooperative arrangements. In the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, for

instance, there are twenty Regional Economic Development Boards that bring together

municipalities and other stakeholders within development zones.21 There are in Canada many

such cooperative institutions, some provincially mandated, that link municipalities in a horizontal

fashion. As well, contractual arrangements for providing particular services across municipal

boundaries are common.

Canadian municipalities operate within vertical tiers of government. Multilevel

structures are commonplace. County systems or their equivalents are found in the big provinces

of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, and in Nova Scotia. In large metropolitan regions the

problem of scale has found three answers.22 The first is the flexible regional authority, of which

the Greater Vancouver Regional District is the prime example. The city of Vancouver proper has

a small population (only 27.5 percent of its Census Metropolitan Area [CMA], which includes 21

other municipalities and three Indian reservations). But the GVRD manages regional water

supply, sewage, parks, and solid waste, as well as planning regional transportation, land use and

air quality. Like the other regional districts in British Columbia, the GVRD encourages inter-

municipal cooperation and is flexible in that municipalities may opt in for particular functions.

The second solution is amalgamation; that is, internalizing all functions within a single,

larger city. Here the most notable examples are Halifax, Ottawa, Winnipeg and Calgary, all of

which largely encompass their CMAs within the footprint of one city government. The third is to

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establish metropolitan authorities where an upper-tier government provides certain common

services. The prototypical Canadian cases were Metropolitan Toronto, established in 1954, and

the Montreal Urban Community, created in 1970. These upper-tier institutions delivered

common services including arterial roads, policing and transit, and water supply and sewers (in

Toronto). But both have now been abolished. Since a massive amalgamation in 1998, the City

of Toronto operates over the whole area that was served by Metro Toronto. In 2002, all the

municipalities on the island of Montreal were amalgamated into the City of Montreal, though

subsequently a new Quebec government permitted secession referenda and some municipalities

did de-amalgamate.23 But tiered government remains necessary. The enlarged city of Toronto

remains too small to manage regional transport and land-use planning issues, so the province has

taken the lead. In Montreal, the core city is part of the Conseil d’Agglomération that provides

important services to all municipalities on the island and also of the Communauté Métropolitaine

de Montréal, which covers the whole Montreal connurbation and has responsibilities for

transportation infrastructure, promotion and planning.24

There are no formal structures through which Aboriginal people participate directly in

local councils in southern Canada.25 Where reserves are near municipalities or within them, there

is consultation about matters such as water supply and waste management, and when new urban

reserves are established within city boundaries, intensive negotiations involve municipal

officials.26 Courts have recently affirmed that local governments have a “duty to consult” with

First Nations when action might affect Aboriginal people’s interests.27 Representatives of

Aboriginal governments sometimes sit on committees managing particular programs or projects,

as in Saskatchewan where the Aboriginal population, over 13 percent of the provincial total, is

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increasingly urbanized.28 Finally, it is worth noting that jurisdiction over off-reserve Aboriginals

living in municipalities is unclear. The federal government does not take responsibility, and so

the cost of services for them are generally borne by provincial and local governments.

Constitutional recognition of local government

Canadian municipalities have no constitutional recognition as a sphere or order of

government. Instead, since 1867, “Municipal Institutions in the Province” have fallen into the

category of matters about which provincial legislatures “may exclusively make Laws.”29 This

fact is primordial to understanding municipal government in Canada. Local governments are

entirely subject to the dictates of provincial governments, which can shift municipal

responsibilities, finances and boundaries as they see fit. Provincial departments enforce the laws

and regulations that govern municipal activities. Often provincial power has been used to good

effect, establishing regional cooperative bodies, for example, and reining in destructive inter-

municipal competition (as in the longstanding Ontario prohibition of municipal concessions to

industry). But provincial constraints and sudden changes to structures and functions have

irritated many municipal leaders. This lack of autonomy also has instilled in some local

politicians and officials a sense of dependence and complacency, and a tendency to blame

provincial authorities for difficulties.30

Canadian provinces do not have separate constitutions, so the framework within which

municipalities operate is established by normal legislation which may be amended at any time.

Municipal Acts (or their equivalents) lay out the governance structures of municipalities and

enumerate their functions. Traditionally, the responsibilities of local governments were narrowly

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defined, with activities prescribed and others proscribed, but over the past decade reforms have

been contemplated in all provinces and implemented in some, notably Alberta, British Columbia,

Ontario and Manitoba. The broad thrust has been to increase municipal autonomy, through

laying out general purposes for local government, defining wide spheres of jurisdiction rather

than narrow functions, and conferring “natural person” powers that allow more latitude in

business matters.31 In British Columbia, the Community Charter Act of 2004 reduced provincial

oversight, stipulated that amalgamations would require the consent of affected communities, and

mandated consultation with the Union of BC Municipalities prior to legislating functional or

financial changes.32 In Ontario, amendments have broadly empowered municipalities to foster

“the current and future economic, social and environmental well-being of the municipality.”33

Some argue, however, that aspects of these reforms were designed to promote a corporate model

for local government; moreover, provincial governments still can override municipalities to

achieve their objectives.34

Some special legislation has focused on big cities. The 2003 City of Winnipeg Charter,

for example, grouped the city’s powers into 14 broad categories and allowed it to act in these

areas without prior provincial approval. It also permitted more business activities, strengthened

planning power, and increased the capacity to promote neighbourhood revitalization, which is

very important for Winnipeg.35 The 2006 City of Toronto Act strengthens the office of the

Mayor, widens the scope for levying new taxes, and generally “recognizes the importance of

providing the City with a legislative framework within which the City can build a strong, vibrant

and sustainable city that is capable of thriving in the global economy.”36 Nevertheless, the

provincial government retains its control over the city. For example, while Toronto now can

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establish a mechanism to hear appeals of planning decisions, the Minister of Municipal Affairs

and Housing can withdraw any and all appeals from the city’s purview and send them to the

provincially appointed Ontario Municipal Board.37

While some constraints have been eased, provincial supremacy remains. A summary

judgement about recent reform is that “neither the fundamental purpose of municipal governance

nor the fundamental nature of the constitutional status, functions, or finances of municipal

governments has been radically transformed.”38 Still, municipal autonomy has been expanded

incrementally in several provinces. Moreover, the courts have recently affirmed “benevolent

construction” as a principle in determining the scope of municipalities’ powers, and have adopted

a demanding standard to strike down municipal bylaws for conflicting with provincial or federal

legislation.39 Achieving more power will depend on how the big cities perform as their economic

and demographic weight increases, and on whether citizens identify more strongly with more

active and visible local governments.

Governance role of local government

Canadian local governments are important. In 2005, municipalities spent $42.5 billion and

school boards another $33.1 billion - a combined total of 6.88 percent of GDP or about $2,400

per capita.40 Direct employees of municipalities - 390,650 people - represent 12.5 percent of the

public-sector workforce, and when school boards and local public enterprises are included, this

figure rises to 32.4 percent.41

Municipalities carry out important functions, ones visible to citizens. In all provinces,

municipalities are primarily responsible for the following:42

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- roads and traffic control

- solid waste collection and disposal (except in Prince Edward Island where the province does it)

- land-use planning and regulation and building regulation

- economic development and tourism promotion

- parks, recreation, cultural facilities and libraries

- business licensing and the regulation or provision of cemeteries

- fire protection and emergency planning and preparedness

- fencing, drainage, animal control and pesticide regulation

In addition, urban municipalities fulfill the following functions:

- policing

- public transit

- water purification and distribution

- sewage collection and treatment

It is striking that Canadian municipalities have only very limited responsibilities for social

services, except in Ontario. Public utilities such as electricity and natural gas are provided

through various mechanisms, while tax collection is generally a local responsibility and tax

assessment is mostly done provincially. It should be stressed that municipalities vary

substantially in their organization and service delivery across the provinces, and comparison is

difficult, as it is too within provinces.

Inevitably some functions are shared with other governments. But this normally means

dividing responsibility at the margins of matters, such as city roads (municipal) and highways

(provincial), or sharing costs, rather than joint administration. It is more common for

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municipalities to serve as agents in implementing the will of senior governments. Here, the

federal government is a small player: its policies may shape the problems local governments

have to manage, such as homelessness, but it does relatively little in consort with municipalities,

nor, except in declared emergencies, can it dictate municipal action. But local governments are

used to implement many provincial-government policies. They enforce building codes, for

example, and have to provide policing, libraries, roads and other goods and services according to

provincial guidelines and standards. The list of prescribed activities grows steadily, with

environmental measures and emergency planning being relatively recent additions. Sometimes

these functions are cost-shared with the provinces, but a development that always alarms

municipal authorities is the imposition of new responsibilities without new financing.

Within the range allowed by provincial regulation, local governments have discretion,

and this has generally been increasing to allow more flexibility in implementation. There is a

clear though contested trend towards contracting out services and forming “P3s” - public-private

partnerships.43 This trend has not proceeded as far in most Canadian provinces as in many

countries, because of public skepticism, the power of unionized municipal workforces, and some

results that have been mixed, at best.44 In personnel matters, local governments have long had

autonomy, but the provinces regulate the qualifications of skilled tradespeople and professionals.

They also impose strict rules about police training, and sometimes provide it.

Turning to internal governance, municipal councillors in Canada are elected, either city-

wide or in wards (which sometimes have multiple members). The choice of system is made

locally. In upper-tier governments, such as counties, representatives are normally selected from

those elected in lower-tier municipalities. When upper-tier councillors have been directly

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elected, the result has been more conflict between the two tiers.45

The terms of councils vary between two and four years, as set by provincial legislation.

The franchise is restricted to Canadian citizens, though there is some pressure in larger cities to

allow permanent residents or landed immigrants to vote. The right to vote is no longer restricted

to property owners, but in a majority of provinces Canadians owning property in any

municipality are entitled to vote in each.

Council has final authority over all policy (subject to provincial dictates and court

decisions). Generally, councils legislate by-laws and leave their execution to the municipal staff.

In smaller local governments, councillors can closely supervise staff, while in the cities

functional council committees allow for both deliberation (and recommendations to council) and

oversight of officials. In some cities there is an executive committee. Montreal, for example,

has a very large council - 64 members plus the mayor - but there is an executive committee of 12

which can grant some contracts, manage personnel and real estate, and prepare by-laws and

budgets for presentation to the full council.

Mayors in Canada are formally rather weak. But they are elected directly, and winning a

city-wide vote can confer much legitimacy and power. The current mayor of Toronto, for

example, received over 332,000 votes in the 2006 election - more than any other politician in the

country. In some places the mayor is designated as Chief Executive Officer, but more power

flows from their staff resources and presence on the job (for serving as councillor is a part-time

position, except in most large cities). Mayors also have close relationships with senior

administrators, especially the Chief Administrative Officer. Managerially, the trend in Canada is

towards the CAO system, though most councils maintain direct contact with departmental

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officials.46

Financing the governance role of local government

The framework of local government finance in Canada is established by provincial law.

Typical is Nova Scotia, where the Municipal Government Act contains 544 substantive sections

that establish the structure and functioning of the province’s municipalities. Sections 54-167

cover financial matters such as borrowing, purchasing, financial statements, payment of taxes,

appeals and so on.47 Extensive regulations flesh out the act, and at least eight other statutes cover

aspects of municipal finances. All municipal authority flows from such statutes: Canadian

municipalities have no constitutional revenue-raising powers.

Within these limits, municipalities have some autonomy in taxation policy. In particular,

they control property tax rates, if not the assessment of the base. They also have latitude in

setting user fees for services, though provincial regulatory agencies often supervise the setting of

rates for utilities. What irks ambitious municipal leaders is the refusal of provincial and federal

governments to grant them access to taxes that grow with the economy, notably sales taxes and

the income tax.48

So Canadian municipalities are unusually dependent on the property tax. In 2004,

municipal governments raised $39.7billion or $1,216 per capita. Of this the real property tax

produced 44.2 percent, and property related taxes another 9.1 percent.49 Other taxes brought in

only 1.4 percent. Other own-source income, mostly from sales of goods and fees for services,

accounted for 29.4 percent of revenue, while transfers made up the remaining 15.9 percent. Of

transfers, the greatest part (73.5 percent) was from provincial governments in the form of

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specific-purpose transfers (“conditional grants”), which fund programs where the province

determines how the money will be used. General-purpose provincial grants made up 18.6

percent of transfers. Specific-purpose transfers from the federal government (mostly payments in

lieu of property taxes) made up just 7.9 percent of transfer payments, and only 1.3 percent of

municipal revenues.

There is considerable variation in revenues across the provinces. In Ontario, total

municipal revenues in 2004 were $1,505 per capita. In Quebec, the figure was about $1,023,

similar to the prairie provinces and British Columbia. In the smaller Atlantic provinces, the

range was from $869 in Nova Scotia to $336 in tiny Prince Edward Island because provincial

governments fulfil more functions directly. The Ontario figures stand out because only there do

municipalities still have substantial responsibility for social services - public health, social

assistance and social housing.

These figures have changed over time in important ways. First, albeit from a minuscule

base, federal transfers to municipalities recently have been increasing substantially. Second,

everywhere except in Alberta, specific-purpose transfers from provincial governments dropped

sharply over the 1994-2004 period, for a national decline of 31.4 percent. Hence the financial

autonomy of municipal governments increased, but they have become no less dependent on the

property tax over time.

There are few formal revenue-sharing arrangements between levels of government in

Canada. With the exception of Manitoba, the bases of important taxes like the federal and

provincial sales and income taxes are not shared with municipalities in any Canadian province.

In 2005, though, the federal government undertook to share its tax on gasoline, with transfers to

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municipalities that will reach $1.6billion per year in 2009-10. Gas-tax sharing is also practiced

in Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta, mainly to finance public transit.

Municipal spending makes up 4.12 percent of GDP. Federal spending in 2004 was

$4,649 per capita (19.6 percent of GDP) and the provinces spent $5,780 per capita (24.9 percent

of GDP).50 So is there a fiscal gap in Canada - a “vertical fiscal imbalance”? There certainly is

one in the view of provincial governments: the federal government has excess revenue relative

to its responsibilities, while the provinces have insufficient revenues to meet growing demands,

especially for their major responsibilities of health and education. Provincial governments have

pressed this claim vociferously.51 But the municipalities too argue strenuously that they suffer

from a vertical fiscal imbalance; in particular, they cannot raise enough revenue to close the

“infrastructure deficit” caused by the combination of rapid growth and old, deteriorating

infrastructure.52 As well, very costly expansions of public transit systems in the cities require

support from other levels of government. These needs are genuine, though some have argued

that municipalities could issue more debt (as interest charges make up only 4 percent of local

government spending)53 Others claim that the property tax is under-utilized, and that it may be

less “inelastic” than is sensed by municipal politicians seeking re-election.54 On the other hand,

some municipal financial distress results from provincial policy (housing and social assistance)

and federal policy (immigration), and this lends legitimacy to local governments’ entreaties for

higher transfers.

Local government spending in Canada is under close provincial surveillance.

Municipalities report in detail about their financial flows, and there are limits on municipal debt.

In Ontario, for example, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing sends annually to all

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municipalities their “financial obligation limit.” The limit essentially caps the proportion of the

normal revenue flow that can be devoted to interest payments. If capital projects would cause

payments to exceed the limit, then permission for borrowing must be sought from the Ontario

Municipal Board.55 Other provinces, mindful of municipalities that went bankrupt in the Great

Depression of the 1930s (and of some more recent cases), have comparable controls. But these

controls do not explain the relatively low level of borrowing by Canadian municipalities.

Overall, local self-government has produced very strong financial accountability.

Municipalities report to provincial governments, which supervise them closely. They are also

accountable to taxpayers, who tend to resist increases in taxes. Despite this, it is not obvious that

municipalities are as efficient as they could possibly be. Their workers are heavily unionized, for

example, and in many cases “contracting-out” could reduce costs. But there are forces tending

towards efficiency - intergovernmental competition between municipalities and the supervision

of provincial governments. Whether policy accountability and democratic control of municipal

governments are as strong as financial accountability is another matter.

Supervising the local government by other orders of government

The federal government of Canada exercises no routine supervisory role over local

governments. But when the federal government signs agreements with municipalities there are

arrangements for financial and managerial accountability. These can be quite complex, as in the

cases of the gasoline-tax sharing agreements and special tripartite (municipal-provincial-federal)

agreements.56

In theory, provincial governments have complete authority over local governments. In

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practice, consultation makes the formal override of municipal by-laws rare. Municipal decisions

about planning, land-use and other matters can be appealed to provincial agencies or cabinets,

and to provincial and federal courts.

The strongest sanction that provincial governments can exercise over municipalities -

short of abolishing them through amalgamation - is to take over their administration. This has

happened in cases of bankruptcy, notably during the 1930s when local economies collapsed, and

this still occurs when major employers fail and tax collection becomes problematic. Hence, for

example, the Saskatchewan Municipal Board, which rules on applications to issue long-term

debt, has as its foremost mission “to maintain financial credibility” for the province’s local

governments.57 In Ontario, municipalities in financial distress can be taken over by the Ministry

of Municipal Affairs and Housing. Provincial governments are under no legal obligation to bail

out municipalities, but in practice they do, and healthy municipal credit ratings partly reflect this

expectation. Provincial governments can also intervene when councils become dysfunctional

because of personal or partisan wrangling. This happened recently in Sherwood, Saskatchewan,

when the province dismissed what was left of the council and appointed a public servant to run

the municipality until new elections could be organized.58 But such events are highly

exceptional.

Municipalities have considerable autonomy in carrying out their functions, and in some

provinces the sphere of independent action has grown. But municipal action is always ultimately

constrained by provincial policy, which prescribes many activities and prohibits others. Changes

to the provincial policy framework are perennial, and local governments must ceaselessly adapt

to provincial policy innovations, which arise not only from the main supervisory ministry but

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also from many other departments and agencies, such as those concerned with environmental

protection, agriculture and natural resources, that have responsibilities which impinge on local-

government activities. Moreover, provincial governments occasionally undertake major changes

to their municipal systems. At times there is pressure for amalgamation. In Quebec, for

example, the number of municipalities dropped from 1400 in 1990 to 1147 in 2006, while in

Ontario, amalgamations between 1996 and 2000 reduced the number of municipalities from 850

to 445. Such consolidations are vigorously contested, and there is little clear evidence that

efficiencies either result at all or offset diminished local control if they do.59 Further, at times

functions are reallocated in a wholesale fashion, as in the “local services realignment” exercise

conducted by the Ontario government in the late 1990s.60 Such events make normal governing

difficult to say the least.

Metropolitan regions are closely supervised. In 1988, for example, the government of

Ontario created an Office of the Greater Toronto Area, headed by a deputy minister, to support a

Co-ordinating Committee that comprised officials from all 35 municipal governments in the

region.61 Currently, within the Ontario ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, the Ontario

Growth Secretariat sets planning policy for the entire Greater Golden Horseshoe, which includes

the CMAs of Peterborough, Oshawa, Toronto, Barrie, Hamilton, St. Catherine’s-Niagara,

Brantford, and Kitchener, with a combined population of 7.4million.62 Similarly, in the province

of Quebec, the Contrat de ville de Montréal specifies precise policy engagements by ten

provincial government departments to help manage the sustainable development of the city.63

And in Vancouver, the provincial government’s responsibility for the 2010 winter Olympics and

its interest in Pacific Gateway infrastructure to improve oceanic trade have led it to take a strong

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hand in planning and management.

Intergovernmental relations with other orders of government

Local authorities in Canada are well organized to promote their common interests. There

is one national association, discussed below, but the main basis of organization is provincial. In

each province and territory are associations of municipalities which constitute the principal

mechanism for broad consultation with provincial governments. Municipalities’ primary

relationships always have been with the provincial governments. These relationships cover

almost every aspect of local government activities, and provincial governments clearly dominate.

Relations with the federal government - which are often mediated by provincial governments -

cover a much narrower range of policy areas. There is no regulation involved here, except that

municipalities have to adhere to federal guidelines concerning matters like airport safety and

policing for national security. Normally the relationship involves local governments qualifying

for federal spending programs.

The relationships of municipal governments with “senior” governments - and municipal

leaders strongly dislike the term - are top-down. Local government representatives may insist

that they constitute a co-equal “order” of government, but in reality they are policy takers, not

full partners. On the other hand, some recent initiatives discussed below have involved

municipalities in joint planning, and their associations continue to press for fuller participation in

policy development.

Local-provincial relations

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22

Formally, and practically too, municipal-provincial relations are hierarchical. The

strongest illustrations of this are the amalgamations that have sometimes been forced upon very

resistant local governments, and sweeping provincial moves to reallocate functions. In the

normal course of affairs, provincial officials set and enforce standards that delineate the contours

of municipal activity. But the relationship is not all top-down. Although “creatures of the

provinces” and subject to provincial control, there is a deeper sense in which municipalities are

also a responsibility of provincial governments. It is incumbent on the latter to ensure that the

municipal system is viable, and so provinces must pay attention, ultimately, to municipal

representations about emerging problems. Where big cities are concerned, provincial

governments must be especially solicitous. Not only is their economic vitality of province-wide

concern, but large cities with dynamic mayors can press provincial politicians on particular

issues, with public support. As one analyst of the Ontario scene observed, “[c]urrently, the City

of Toronto has twenty-two members of parliament, twenty-two members of the provincial

legislature, and one mayor. It is not difficult to figure out who will speak with the greatest

authority about the needs of the people of Toronto.”64 Given the paucity of large cities in

individual jurisdictions, one cannot claim that provincial governments have “urban policies,” but

they must be attentive to big-city requirements.

There are a great many avenues for municipal-provincial interaction. The normal channel

for most business is the responsible department. The breadth of these departments’ mandates

varies, and local-government matters are often combined with other branches of activity.65

Where the mandate scope is narrow, and in any case for a lot of other business, municipalities

deal with the many functional departments that affect them - Environment, Recreation, Heritage,

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23

Natural Resources, Transportation, and so on. This official-to-official interaction is by far the

most common form; indeed, it is routine. But there are other avenues.

In larger municipalities, there are specialists in intergovernmental relations, reporting

either to the Chief Administrative Officer or to the Mayor. Their role is to fix problems by

dealing with provincial officials and politicians. At the political level, mayors often

communicate with local members of the provincial legislature. Mayors can sometimes conduct

business with ministers and ministerial aides. Another political channel is to appear before

legislative committees when these bodies are considering measures that affect all municipalities

or particular ones. These are formal occasions, but also lend themselves to quiet lobbying.

To make known their collective views about policy, local governments depend on

provincial associations of municipalities. The associations have expertise, with professional staff

supporting a range of committees concerned with particular issues. Some associations act as

umbrella groups for others. The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO), for example,

includes regional and rural affiliates, an association for municipal administrators, and a bulk

purchasing company. But the associations vary in strength. In some provinces such as Alberta

they are split between urban and rural municipalities, and there are also linguistic groupings in

New Brunswick, Manitoba and Ontario. Undoubtedly municipal size is the major cleavage

among Canadian local governments, and it has led to serious divisions. Both Montreal and

Toronto have dropped out of their provincial association. Within provinces, there are also

specialized associations grouping officials like police chiefs and municipal treasurers, and these

liaise regularly with provincial officials. But it is the major representative associations which

attract politicians’ attention and which have the expertise to convey municipal opinion to the

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24

provincial bureaucracy.

This occurs formally at annual meetings, where association members pass resolutions,

mostly recommending changes to provincial policy. Many of these have already been processed

through committees and the executive and have supporting documentation prepared by staff;

others arise from individual municipalities. For example, the Union of British Columbia

Municipalities at its annual convention routinely deals with dozens of formal resolutions,

concerning issues ranging from tire recycling to the length of councillors’ terms, and in due

course, in a single document, the provincial government formally replies to each one of them.66

At the annual conference of AMO, many provincial ministers appear, and there is an

institutionalized process for local governments to petition to have a delegation meet with them.67

These associations are the main force that Canadian municipalities have organized to represent

their interests to provincial governments, and they are often effective. But of course the province

has the final word.

Overall, the municipal-provincial relationship is sometimes conflictual, and tense

episodes attract much attention, but it must be judged as generally cooperative. Each level of

government will try to rally support for its demands and objectives, but neither one can afford

sustained conflict. The local governments cannot alienate the centre of so much power over

them. But provincial governments need to maintain a healthy municipal system, and for reasons

both administrative and political they must stay attuned to general municipal needs. After all,

municipalities are repositories of expertise in important fields like planning, physical

infrastructure, waste management and recreation. As well, they have established relationships

with all kinds of local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are increasingly important

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25

in governance. Politically, ill-advised provincial decisions can galvanize voters, especially in

smaller municipalities, to the peril of provincial politicians. So the provincial governments must

listen. Nevertheless, for prudential reasons and in order to deliver their own policies, they have

traditionally supervised municipal behaviour rather closely. These fetters have irritated,

especially where finances are concerned, but most municipalities quietly adhere to a modest role

of providing services to residents and their properties. So the provincial-municipal relationship

continues to be one of cooperation and incremental change through asymmetric mutual

accommodation.

Local-federal relations

Local government is well organized to deal with the federal government. Although a

federated structure is characteristic of most Canadian associations (including ones interested in

specialized areas of municipal government), the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM)

has direct membership. It represents over 90 percent of all municipalities, and is the main

interlocutor of the federal government on municipal files. It has a large board of directors, an

extensive set of committees dealing with particular policy areas, and a substantial professional

staff. While there are sub-groupings within it, notably the Big City Mayors’ Caucus, the FCM

leadership believes that its considerable power and success derive from its broadly representative

character.

Direct relations between the federal government and local authorities are much less

pervasive than provincial-municipal relations, because of jurisdictional reasons and historic

caution on the federal side about initiatives that could lead to a plethora of demands. (An

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26

exception to federal non-intervention is the National Capital Commission, a public enterprise that

plans and promotes the National Capital District; however, given provincial and municipal

sensitivities, the NCC has operated pragmatically, through consensus and the federal spending

power.68) But there has been much recent change in municipal-federal relations. Due to

restructuring, fiscal strain, and demographic pressures, Canadian municipalities have demanded

assistance and recognition from the federal government. All municipalities want more money,

many seek consultation about policies affecting them, and some want greater autonomy and

power.69 The cities’ case has been advanced by influential think-tanks and business

organizations.70

The federal government responded to early pressures with several initiatives. Programs

to build infrastructure (broadly defined), with funding from all three levels of government, were

launched in 1993.71 When the Liberal government headed by Paul Martin was in power (2003-

2006), the prime minister boldly announced a “New Deal” for cities and communities, with new

respect for the municipal “order” of government, funding for transit, a full rebate of the federal

sales tax on municipal expenditures, and transfers of a portion of the federal gasoline tax.72 As

well, new initiatives addressed homelessness, urban Aboriginal people, the social economy, and

poverty, all requiring federal involvement with municipalities and community groups.73 Finally,

renewed tripartite agreements signed with Vancouver (and British Columbia) and Winnipeg (and

Manitoba) to attack particular problems in those cities seemed to presage the spreading of urban

development agreements to other cities.74

There is no federal ministry responsible for dealing with municipal governments. A

Ministry of State for Urban Affairs was established in the 1970s, but it had little clout in Ottawa

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27

and irritated the provincial governments, so it withered away.75 In 2003, a Cities Secretariat was

established within the federal Privy Council Office, and in 2004 as part of the New Deal there

was established a Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities. Ministry officials

negotiated the gasoline tax arrangements with the provinces, and aimed to create new urban

development agreements. But the Conservative administration led by Stephen Harper (2006-)

rolled the unit into the Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Portfolio, a downgrading that

reflected the government’s general view of federalism - that the federal government should

respect the constitutional division of jurisdiction.76

Another federal department linked to municipalities is Human Resources and Social

Development Canada, which runs many programs focused on community development, labour

and homelessness. These are delivered within municipalities, though implementation often

involves social groups rather than organs of local governments.77 Many other federal

departments interact with municipal governments, often through low-visibility bureaucratic

channels. Indeed, beyond the big intergovernmental initiatives exists a largely unexplored world

of municipal-federal contacts. These occur in many areas of joint interest, such as labour market

and business development, federal property, arts and culture, immigrant settlement and urban

Aboriginal problems. New principles of public management have increased officials’ discretion

at all levels of government, and transgovernmental coalitions can assemble to undertake

particular projects. Local politicians also meet freely with their federal counterparts. Still,

municipalities sometimes complain that there is no central portal for dealing with the federal

government.

Provincial governments mediate the contacts between “their” municipalities and Ottawa.

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28

At one extreme is Quebec, which sequesters its local governments. By law, no municipal

government can enter agreements with Canada, other provinces or other countries without the

authorization of the provincial government - and this is enforced.78 It helps municipalities’

bargaining power while preserving the province’s sovereign prerogatives. (Nevertheless,

Quebec’s position does not preclude fruitful interaction, as in greater Montreal, where efforts to

attract investment and stimulate key sectors are co-ordinated through Montréal International, an

organization that has five provincial and five federal ministries as partners, along with many

municipalities and firms.79)

Quebec is special, but all provinces mediate municipal-federal relations. While

constitutional power gives them the upper hand in these dealings, the federal purse and municipal

demands make tri-level bargaining more complex. Depending on the province’s situation and

the policy at issue, provinces may simply monitor municipal-federal interactions. Or, they can

advocate for municipalities, broker between the parties, regulate the interaction, or join as a

partner - and this can be done through tripartite mechanisms or by the province alone through

line departments or central agencies, including the premier’s office.80 Tri-level negotiations are

not a simple game in Canada.

The governments of large cities have separate relations with the federal government.

Mayors and senior officials have access to top-ranking federal bureaucrats, and they also can

meet with ministers. As well, a longstanding federal tradition is to name a “political minister”

for each province to handle sensitive issues, and big-city politicians use this channel; in fact,

recent governments have designated political ministers with special responsibilities for Montreal

and the Greater Toronto Area.

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29

The rising demands of all municipalities and the increasing assertiveness of the big cities

and their allies have posed challenges for federal governments. But Canadian local government

is certainly not a full partner in the federation, despite the promises of the New Deal period.

Provinces control municipalities, and there are good, self-interested reasons for the federal

government to cleave to this. Naturally, federal governments want their activities to have a high

profile in municipalities and especially big cities (for currently, 85 of 308 House of Commons

seats are in the CMAs of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver), but this need not require much

interaction with municipal governments per se.

Essentially, then, intergovernmental relations in Canada still means provincial-municipal

interactions on the one hand and federal-provincial ones on the other. Where this distinction has

been breached, in the view of some observers, a flexible and “place-based” federal orientation

has produced better policies, ones more suited than usual to local conditions.81 A parallel

argument is that new federal transfers are but the harbinger of an imperative national effort to

keep Canadian cities competitive.82 So intergovernmental relations may continue to become

more dense and widespread. But there are costs attached to tri-level policy making.

Negotiations can delay policy and generate high transactions costs, and management structures

can be overly complex, especially when NGOs are involved. Accountability is an issue when

responsibility is widely shared. New federal initiatives involving municipalities can create both

federal-provincial tensions and dissatisfaction within the provincial-municipal relationship

(especially when large and small municipalities are treated differently). In the end, Canadian

municipalities may serve themselves best not by approaching the federal government but by

focusing demands for money and power upon their jurisdictional masters - the provinces.

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30

Political culture of local governance

Municipal politics in Canada has a relatively low profile. This stems in part from the

sense that local governments merely exist to provide a limited range of rather banal services, a

perception that is weaker of course in the big cities. As well, there are few political parties

operating at the local level. Municipal parties exist in Quebec, encouraged by provincial

legislation, and in British Columbia, where politics are polarized between left and right, and

there have been parties and party-like “slates” of candidates in several other cities.83 But the

Canadian party system is remarkable because the major federal and provincial parties are largely

distinct, even when they share the same label, and because the system does not incorporate

municipal politics. So the tradition of non-partisanship prevails, even though many local

politicians are known to be members of federal or provincial parties, and others are recruited by

parties to seek provincial or federal office.84 Non-partisanship probably diminishes electoral

participation and certainly weakens collective accountability; as well, intergovernmental relations

lack the partisan connections which can sometimes smooth relations and sometimes obstruct

them, but which always help organize them.

The public’s interest in local elections is relatively low. Turnout rates vary and no

centralized statistics are available, but on average perhaps 35 - 45 percent of the electorate votes.

This is substantially below federal and provincial rates, which have typically been about 60 - 75

percent.

But there are other participatory mechanisms. Because Canada is a developed and stable

society, municipalities contain dense webs of voluntary associations - NGOs - through which

people can participate in governance. There are business associations, churches, service clubs,

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31

recreational associations, and groups representing many special interests. The NGOs are vehicles

for citizen input into policy making. (They are also conduits for policy implementation, because

they harness volunteer energy and they sometimes assemble people who are the objects of policy;

hence many social policy initiatives bypass municipal governments altogether and work through

NGOs.) Individuals also have ample opportunities to express their views. Contact with

politicians and officials is simple and personal in smaller municipalities. Committees of council

meet publicly to discuss issues, and residents often can speak their mind. When budgets are

presented and community plans and zoning are at issue, more extensive participatory exercises

occur, though turnout at these sessions is often low. Participatory opportunities are exploited

most by business interests (especially developers), special-interest groups (like patrons of cultural

facilities), “ratepayers’ associations” (which aim for low taxes), and residents opposing particular

development projects. Broad and sustained engagement in civic issues is not the norm in

Canada.

In Canadian politics, gender is always an issue. Despite expectations that more women

would stand for election and be more successful at the local level than at others, this does not

seem to be true.85 Obstacles remain, including unequal sharing of domestic work and “old boys

networks” that groom male candidates. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities and local

groups are campaigning for increased representation of women.86 Visible minorities are also

under-represented in municipal government; moreover, urban constituencies in Canada, where

most recent immigrants live, contain more voters than the over-represented rural areas, so

attenuating the weight of visible minorities.87

Municipal political culture does affect intergovernmental relations in Canada. Local

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32

politicians tend to be cautious and oriented towards the status quo, as long as economic growth

proceeds. In small and medium-sized municipalities, which emphasize non-partisan service

provision, provincial governments are regarded with a mixture of deference and irritation. For

most municipalities, the federal government is far away. The provincial associations and the

FCM are effective and strongly supported, but demands necessarily reflect the broadest possible

consensus and they are not visible to citizens. The big-city mayors are outspoken, but

intermittently and non-ideologically. For most municipalities, therefore, intergovernmental

relations are subdued and often technical, not political, with the most common stance being one

of deserving supplication.

Emerging issues and trends

Municipal governments in Canada and their relations with the provincial and federal

governments are relatively stable. This is because of long tradition and because the system has

worked reasonably well; moreover, the economic environment has been highly favourable for 60

years, with only occasional recessions and none since 1992. Canada is a fortunate country.

The biggest issue facing municipalities, in their view, is a shortfall of resources. They

depend heavily on the property tax for revenue, and municipal politicians believe that tax

increases cause hardship to some, reduce competitiveness, and are politically damaging. So they

have turned to other revenue sources, and they have argued the case for larger transfers from

other levels of government. The federal government responded with despite significant new

transfers, but those came when the “cities agenda” was a national priority. More federal funding

is unlikely, so inevitably the municipalities will turn towards their provincial masters. Recently,

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33

only the government of Quebec has produced a more generous system, though others have

provided some access to new revenue sources. In the medium term, if municipal needs keep

growing, provincial governments will probably extend more financial aid. Should one provincial

government make a substantial move, the pressure on others to do the same would be intense.88

Another major problem is coping with disparities among municipalities. For a very long

time, the legislative framework for local government was essentially uniform in each province.

But now conditions have diverged. In the cities, there is growth pressure from large immigrant

flows, which bodes well for their economic futures but creates social, economic and

environmental stresses. In contrast are declining towns and rural municipalities, where there

exist major problems of sustainability. Overall, a move is underway to grant cities increasing

autonomy and access to revenue sources. As legal frameworks broaden, it is likely that local

authorities will occupy new functions and revenue sources when they are ready to do so, perhaps

even tackling the challenges of sprawl, immigrant integration and poverty. The process may be

one of “opting in” to new powers, which is quite in line with the tradition of incremental

change.89 The distress of communities in decline, however, will not be solved by more powers.

Money is required.

In the longer term, if the demographic and economic dominance of big municipalities -

city-regions - continues to increase, Canadians may debate the roles and relative powers of cities

and provinces. Suggestions have been made that constitutional changes should enshrine a new

status and powers for cities, but this is highly improbable, as there is little appetite for any

constitutional amendment in Canada. An alternative view is that functions necessarily will be

devolved to economically dominant cities from the federal and especially the provincial

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34

governments: this could lead to an “hourglass federalism,” with strong municipalities and a

strong centre.90 But there is no reason in principle to accept this economic determinism; instead,

more assertive and powerful municipalities may evolve as citizens increasingly identify with

their cities. In practice, however, there is much evidence that provincial power, cemented in the

constitution, is shaping the future of city-regions. Quebec governments have forced

amalgamations and allowed de-amalgamations; the province of British Columbia runs the two

greatest projects afoot there; and Toronto’s new powers pale beside sweeping provincial

initiatives to manage development in the Greater Golden Horseshoe region. In the face of city-

regions’ economic strength and swelling, loyal populations, the provinces will not fade away. On

the contrary, their pivotal role in the Canadian intergovernmental system will continue long into

the future.

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NOTES

1.Larry S. Bourne and Damaris Rose, “The Changing Face of Canada: the Uneven Geographies

of Population and Social Change,” Canadian Geographer 45:1 (Spring 2001): 105-19.

2.Thomas J. Courchene, A State of Minds: Towards a Human Capital Future for Canadians

(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2001).

3.Canada, Statistics Canada, Population and dwelling counts, for Canada and census subdivisions

(municipalities) with 5,000-plus population, 2006 and 2001 censuses - 100% data, at

http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/popdwell/Table.cfm?T=307&S=3&O=D&RPP=

699, accessed 25 June 2007.

4.“Urban” is defined as an area with a population of at least 1,000 and density of at least 400

people per square kilometer, a definition which includes rather small towns.

5.Canada, Statistics Canada, Portrait of the Canadian Population in 2006, 2006 Census,

Population and Dwelling Counts, Catalogue no. 97-550-XIE, March 2007.

6.Canada, Statistics Canada, 2001 Census of Population (Provinces, Census Divisions,

Municipalities), 2001 Languages, Mobility and Migration, at

http://estat.statcan.ca/cgi-win/CNSMCGI.EXE?Lang=E&DBSelect=SD2001_4, accessed 25

June 2007.

7.Canada, Statistics Canada, Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure-Based (Quarterly), at

http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/econ41.htm, accessed 25 June 2007. All figures are in current

$US.

8.Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Economic Observer: Historical Statistical Supplement

2005/06, Catalogue No. 11-210XIB, July 2006, Table 4.

9.Canada, Statistics Canada, Tables 380-0016 and 380-0022, E-stat Online database, through

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36

http://cansim2.statcan.ca/cgi-win/CNSMCGI.EXE, accessed 26 June 2007.

10.Canada, Statistics Canada, Public Sector Statistics: Financial Management System 2005-

2006, Catalogue 68-213 XIE, July 2006, Tables 5-1 and 1-7.

11.For basic information on Canadian federalism, see the Gobal Dialogue on Federalism Series,

all published in Montreal for Forum of Federations by McGill-Queen’s University Press: Rainer

Knopf and Anthony Sayers, “Canada,” Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal

Countries ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr, v.1 (2005), pp. 103-142; Richard Simeon and

Martin Papillon, “Canada,” Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, ed.

Akhtar Majeed, et. al. v.2 (2006), pp. 91-122; Thomas O. Hueglin, “Canada,” Legislative,

Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries, ed. Katy Le Roy, et. al. v.3 (2006), pp.

101-134, Robin Boadway, “Canada,” The Practice of Fiscal Federalism, ed. Anwar Shah, v.4

(2007), pp. 98-124.

12.Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

13.Robert A. Young, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (Montreal: McGill-

Queen’s University Press, 1995).

14.This tension is explored throughout a basic text on Canadian municipal government: see C.

th
Richard Tindal and Susan Nobes Tindal, Local Government in Canada, 6 ed. (Toronto: Nelson,

2004). Another useful text is Katherine A. Graham and Susan D. Phillips with Allan M.

Maslove, Urban Governance in Canada: Representation, Resources, and Restructuring (Toronto:

Harcourt Canada, 1998).

15.See Kenneth Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of

Toronto Press, 1954), pp. 19-47.

16.Robert A. Young, “Remembering Equal Opportunity: Clearing the Undergrowth in New

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37

Brunswick,” Canadian Public Administration 30:1 (Spring 1987): 88-102.

17.Mary W. Rowe, ed. Toronto: Considering Self-Government (Owen Sound, Ontario: The

Ginger Press, 2000).

18.Statistics Canada, source as in Note 3. The metropolitan areas of these cities, which

sometimes share their interests, are even weightier as a percentage of provincial populations:

Winnipeg - 60.5 percent, Halifax - 40.8 percent, Calgary - 32.8 percent, Montreal - 48.2 percent,

and Toronto - 42.0 percent.

19.See

http://www.edmonton.ca/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_265_210_0_43/http%3B/CMS

Server/COEWeb/city+government/civic+agencies/list+of+civic+agencies/, accessed 26 June

2007. Typically such agencies are controlled by the municipality, but their Boards of Directors

often include ordinary citizens, experts, and representatives of business and non-governmental

organizations.

20.For the general argument contrasting special-purpose and multi-purpose authorities, see Lisbet

Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level

Governance,” American Political Science Review 97:2 (May 2003): 233-43.

21.See http://www.intrd.gov.nl.ca/intrd/economicboards.htm, accessed 15 May 2008.

22.Andrew Sancton, “Metropolitan and Regional Governance,” Urban Policy Issues: Canadian

Perspectives, 2nd ed., eds. Edmund P. Fowler and David Siegel (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford

University Press, 2002), pp. 54-68.

23.Andrew Sancton, “Fusions et défusions municipales au Québec et en Ontario,” Le parti

Libéral: Enquête sur les réalisations du gouvernement Charest, eds. François Pétry, Éric

Bélanger, et Louis M. Imbeau, (Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2006), pp. 321-38.

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38

24.Pierre Hamel, “Municipal Reform in Quebec: The Trade-off between Centralization and

Decentralization,” Municipal Reform in Canada, eds. Joseph Garcea and Edward C. LeSage Jr.

(Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 149-73. It should be noted that

Montreal is divided into arrondissements (boroughs), each with a mayor and council, so the

governance structure there is particularly complex.

25.For arrangements in the northern Territories see Katherine A.H. Graham, “Municipal Reform

in the Northern Territories: Now for Something Different,” Municipal Reform, pp. 269-86.

26.Teresa M. Dust, “The Impact of Aboriginal Land Claims and Self-governance on Canadian

Municipalities,” Canadian Public Administration 40:3 (Fall 1997): 481-94.

27.Signa A. Daum Shanks, “Municipalities and First Nations Reserves: What’s the

Connection?,” Municipal World (January 2007): 31-2, 42.

28.Joseph Garcea and Ken Pontikes, “Federal-Municipal-Provincial Relations in Saskatchewan:

Provincial Roles, Approaches, and Mechanisms,” Canada: The State of the Federation 2004

Municipal-Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada, eds. Robert Young and Christian Leuprecht

(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), pp. 349-50.

29.Canada, Constitution Act 1867, Section 92(8).

30.David Siegel, “Recent Changes in Provincial-Municipal Relations in Ontario: A New Era or a

Missed Opportunity?” Canada: The State of the Federation 2004, pp. 181-97. See also David

Siegel and C. Richard Tindal, “Changing the Municipal Culture: From Comfortable

Subordination to Assertive Maturity,” Parts I and II, Municipal World, (March and April 2006),

pp. 37-40 and 13-17.

31.Joseph Garcea and Edward C. LeSage Jr., “Municipal Reform Agendas and Initiatives:

Analytical Framework and Overview,” Municipal Reform, pp. 3-22.

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39

32.Patrick J. Smith and Kennedy Stewart, “Local Government Reform in British Columbia,

1991-2005: One Oar in the Water,” Municipal Reform, pp. 25-56.

33.Ontario, “Municipal Act”, Statutes of Ontario 2001, Chapter 25, Section 2. c.

34.Smith and Stewart, “Local Government Reform,” 38-46; Christopher Leo and Mark Piel,

“Municipal Reform in Manitoba: Homogenizing, Empowering, and Marketing Municipal

Government,” Municipal Reform, pp. 106-26.

35.Ibid.

36.Ontario, Statutes of Ontario 2006, Chapter 11, Schedule A, Preamble. The title of the act is

the “Stronger City of Toronto for a Stronger Ontario Act.”

37.Ibid., Section 115. 16.

38.Garcea and LeSage, “Municipal Reform Agendas,” 16-17.

39.Canada, Supreme Court of Canada, Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2000 SCC 13

[2000] 1 S.C.R. 342. See also 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson

(Town), 2001 SSC 40 [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 upholding the power of a municipality to regulate for

health purposes. On the other hand, the courts have not taken an expansive view about municipal

revenue raising powers, by protecting provincial control over direct taxation and requiring that

user fees fairly reflect the cost of the service provided.

40.Statistics Canada, source as in Note 9, and http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/govt34a.htm,

accessed 15 May 2008.

41.Canada, Statistics Canada, Table 282-0012, E-stat Online database, and

http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/govt54a.htm, accessed 26 June 2007.

42.Andrew Sancton, “Introduction,” Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces, eds. Andrew

Sancton and Robert Young (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).

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40

43.See British Columbia, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Public Private Partnership: A Guide for

Local Government (Victoria: n.p., May 1999), at

http://www.cserv.gov.bc.ca/lgd/policy_research/library/public_private_partnerships.pdf, accessed

26 June 2007.

44.See a study commissioned by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities: Pierre J. Hamel,

Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) and Municipalities: Beyond Principles, a Brief Overview of

Practices (Montreal: INRS-UCS, 2007).

45.Andrew Sancton, “Metropolitan and Regional Governance,” p. 60.

46.Tindal and Tindal, Local Government in Canada, pp. 277-84.

47.Nova Scotia, Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1998, c.18.

48.Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Big City Mayors’ Caucus, Our Cities, Our Future:

Addressing the Fiscal Imbalance in Canada’s Cities Today, June 2006, at

http://www.fcm.ca/english/documents/bcmcfinal.pdf, accessed 27 June 2007. See also Harry M.

Kitchen and Enid Slack, “Special Study: New Finance Options for Municipal Governments,”

Canadian Tax Journal 51:6 (June 2003): 2215-2275. An exception to this pattern is Manitoba,

where 4.15 percent of personal and corporate income tax is distributed to municipalities.

49.Statistics Canada, CanSim II Tables 385-0024 and 385-0004, at

http://cansim2.statcan.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?LANG=E&RegTkt=&C2Sub=&C2DB=PRD&R

OOTDIR=CII/&LangFldr=&ResultTemplate=CII/CII_FLst&CIITables=3059, accessed 27 June

2007.

50.Ibid., Tables 385-0001, 051-0001, 379-0017 and 379-0020, through

http://cansim2.statcan.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?CANSIMFile=CII/CII_1_E.HTM&RootDir=CII/

&LANG=E, accessed 27 June 2007.

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51.Canada, The Council of the Federation, Advisory Panel on Fiscal Imbalance, Reconciling the

Irreconcilable: Addressing Canada’s Fiscal Imbalance, March 2006, at

http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/keyinitiatives/AdvisoryPanel.html, accessed 27 June 2007.

52.Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Building Prosperity from the Ground Up: Restoring

Municipal Fiscal Balance, June 2006, at

http://www.fcm.ca/english/media/backgrounders/fiscalim.pdf, accessed 27 June 2007.

53.Richard M. Bird and Duan-jie Chen, “Federal Finance and Fiscal Federalism: the Two Worlds

of Canadian Public Finance,” Canadian Public Administration 41:1 (Spring 1998): 51-74.

54.Jack M. Mintz and Tom Roberts, Running on Empty: A Proposal to Improve City Finances,

C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, No. 226, February 2006.

55.Government of Ontario, Ontario Regulation 403/02, under the Municipal Act 2001, made 18

December 2002, at

http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/DBLaws/Source/Regs/English/2002/R02403_e.htm

56.See, for example, Canada, Infrastructure Canada, Canada-New Brunswick, “Agreement on the

Transfer of Federal Gas Tax Revenues Under the New Deal for Cities and Communities 2005-

2015,” 25 November 2005, at

http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/communities-collectivites/agreements-ententes/gas-essence_tax/g

t_can_nb_e.shtml, accessed 27 June 2007; Canada, Western Economic Diversification Canada,

“Canada-Manitoba-Winnipeg Agreement for Community and Economic Development,” 20 May

2004, at http://www.wd.gc.ca/ced/urban/agreements/may2004/default_e.asp, both accessed 27

June 2007.

57.Government of Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Municipal Board, Annual Report 2004, n.d., p.

4, at http://www.smb.gov.sk.ca/documents/ar_2004.pdf, accessed 27 June 2007.

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58.John Intini, “That’s enough arguing. You’re all out of here,” Maclean’s, 5 March 2007, p. 33.

59.Pierre J. Hamel et al. “Les administrations municipales au Québec: organisation,

fonctionnement et tendances” and David Siegel, “Ontario: a Province in Steady Transition,”

Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces; see also Andrew Sancton,"Reducing Costs by

Consolidating Municipalities: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario," Canadian Public

Administration 39:3 (Autumn 1996): 267-89, and Sancton, Merger Mania: The Assault on Local

Government (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000).

60.Katherine A. Graham and Susan D. Phillips, “‘Who Does What= in Ontario: The Process of

Provincial-Municipal Disentanglement,” Canadian Public Administration 41:2 (Summer 1998):

175-209.

61.Tindal and Tindal, Local Government in Canada, p. 109.

62.See Government of Ontario, Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, Places to Grow:

Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2006),

and information at http://www.pir.gov.on.ca/english/growth/contact.htm, accessed 27 June 2007.

63.Ville de Montréal et Gouvernement du Québec, Contrat de Ville de Montréal, 2003-2007,

2003, at http://www2.ville.montreal.qc.ca/ocpm/pdf/PD05/3j.pdf., accessed 26 June 2007.

64.David Siegel, “Recent Changes in Provincial-Municipal Relations in Ontario,” 191.

65.For Ontario - Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing; British Columbia - Community

Services (Local Government Department); Nova Scotia - Service Nova Scotia and Municipal

Relations; Manitoba - Intergovernmental Affairs (Municipal Finance and Advisory Services);

Nunavut - Department of Community and Government Services, and so on.

66.See the two documents at http://www.civicnet.bc.ca/siteengine/ActivePage.asp?PageID=208,

accessed 27 June 2007.

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67.This is arranged by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. See

http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page4760.aspx, accessed 27 June 2007.

68.David L. A. Gordon, “Ottawa-Hull and Canberra: Implementation of Capital City Plans,”

Canadian Journal of Urban Research, 11:2 (Winter 2002): 179-211,

69.Robert Young, “The Politics of Paying for Cities in Canada,” Paying for Cities: The Search

for Sustainable Municipal Revenues, ed. Paul Boothe (Edmonton: The Institute for Public

Economics, 2003), pp. 83-97. Demands for funding and federal assistance also surfaced in the

late 1800s, the 1930s and the 1960s.

70.TD Bank Financial Group, A Choice Between Investing in Canada’s Cities or Disinvesting in

Canada’s Future, TD Economics Special Report, 22 April 2002; Toronto City Summit Alliance,

Enough Talk: An Action Plan for the Toronto Region, April 2003; Conference Board of Canada,

Mission Possible: Successful Canadian Cities, The Canada Project, Final Report, Volume III,

February 2007.

71.Loleen Berdahl, “The Federal Urban Role and Federal-Municipal Relations,” Canada: The

State of the Federation 2004, pp. 25-43.

72.Paul Martin, “Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin to the Conference of the Federation of

Canadian Municipalities,” St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, 5 June 2005.

73.Neil Bradford, Whither the Federal Urban Agenda? A New Deal in Transition, Canadian

Policy Research Networks, Family Network, Research Report F/65, February 2007.

74.For a detailed study of the Vancouver Agreement, see Michael Mason, Collaborative

partnerships for urban development: a study of the Vancouver Agreement [online]. London, LSE

Research Online at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/692/, accessed 27 June 2007. New agreements,

smaller in scope, were signed with the province of Saskatchewan and the cities of Regina and

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Saskatoon in 2005.

75.Lionel D. Feldman and Katherine A. Graham, Bargaining for Cities (Montreal: Institute for

Research on Public Policy, 1979).

76.Robert Young, “Open Federalism and Canadian Municipalities,” in Keith G. Banting et al.,

Open Federalism: Interpretations, Significance (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental

Relations, 2006), pp. 7-24.

77.Neil Bradford, Place-based Public Policy: Towards a New Urban and Community Agenda for

Canada, Canadian Policy Research Networks, Family Network, Research Report F/51, March

2005.

78.Québec, Revised Statutes of Québec (Québec: Éditeur Officiel, 2002), Chapter M-30, “An

Act Respecting the Ministère du Conseil Exécutif,” Section 3.11.

79.Montreal International, Partner in Greater Montréal’s Prosperity - Report of Activities 2006,

at http://www.montrealinternational.com/docs/2007/Rapport2006En.pdf, accessed 27 June 2007.

80.This is based on Garcea and Pontikes, “Federal-Municipal-Provincial Relations in

Saskatchwan.” These authors also provide a useful (and unique) compendium of collaborative

programs and projects in the province of Saskatchewan.

81.Christopher Leo, “Deep Federalism: Respecting Community Difference in National Policy,”

Canadian Journal of Political Science 36:2 (September 2006): 481-506.

82.Thomas J. Courchene, “Global Futures for Canada’s Global Cities,” Institute for Research on

Public Policy, Policy Matters 8:2, June 2007.

83.Tindal and Tindal, Local Government in Canada, pp. 315-31.

84.In the current House of Commons, 39% of the 306 sitting members had experience in local

government, usually as councillors and mayors but sometimes as members of school boards:

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found through

http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Lists/ParliamentarianAge.aspx?Menu=HOC-Bio&Chamber=03d

93c58-f843-49b3-9653-84275c23f3fb, accessed 27 June 2007.

85.See Elisabeth Gidengil and Richard Vengroff, “Representational Gains of Canadian Women

or Token Growth? The Case of Quebec’s Municipal Politics,” Canadian Journal of Political

Science 30:3 (September 1997): 513-37.

86.The FCM estimates that women make up 21.7 percent of all municipal councillors, just

slightly higher than their proportion in the current House of Commons. See FCM, Women in

Municipal Politics, at http://www.fcm.ca/english/policy/big.pdf, and for information on the FCM

campaign, see http://www.fcm.ca/english/policy/women.html both accessed 27 June 2007.

87.Michael Pal and Sujit Choudhry, Is Every Ballot Equal? Visible-Minority Vote Dilution in

Canada, IRPP Choices, 13:1, January 2007.

88.Courchene, “Global Futures,” p. 33.

89.Kari Roberts and Roger Gibbins, Apples and Oranges? Urban Size and the Municipal-

Provincial Partnership, Discussion Paper, Canada West Foundation, October 2005.

90.Thomas J. Courchene, “Hourglass Federalism - How the Feds Got the Provinces to Run Out

of Money in a Decade of Liberal Budgets,” Policy Options 25:4 (April 2004): 12-17.

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